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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first chapter studies whether credit demand
is sensitive to interest rates, to the prominence of interest rate disclosure, and to nudges.
Consumer credit regulations usually require that lenders disclose interest rates. However,
lenders can evade the spirit of these regulations by concealing rates in the fine print and
highlighting low monthly payments. I explore the importance of such evasion in Brazil,
where consumer credit for lower and middle income borrowers is expanding rapidly, despite
particularly high interest rates. By randomizing contract interest rates and the degree
of interest rate disclosure, I show that most borrowers are highly rate-sensitive, whether
or not interest rates are prominently disclosed in marketing materials. An exception is
high-risk borrowers, for whom rate disclosure matters. These clients are rate-sensitive only
when disclosure is prominent. I also show that borrowers who choose this type of financing
are responsive to nudges that favor longer-term plans. Despite this evidence, the financial
consequences of information disclosure, even for high-risk borrowers, are relatively modest,
and clients are less susceptible to nudges when the stakes are higher. Together, these
results suggest that consumers in Brazil are surprisingly adept at decoding information
even when lenders try to obfuscate the interest rate information, suggesting a fair amount
of sophistication in this population.
The second chapter (co-authored with Leonardo Bursztyn, Florian Ederer, and Noam
Yuchtman) studies the importance of peer effects in financial decisions. Using a field exper-
iment conducted with a financial brokerage, we attempt to disentangle channels through
which a person's financial decisions affect his peers'. When someone purchases an asset, his
peers may also want to purchase it because they learn from his choice ("social learning")
and because his possession of the asset directly affects others' utility of owning the same
asset ("social utility"). We randomize whether one member of a peer pair who chose to
purchase an asset has that choice implemented, thus randomizing possession of the asset.
Then, we randomize whether the second member of the pair: 1) receives no information
about his peer, or 2) is informed of his peer's desire to purchase the asset and the result
of the randomization determining possession. We thus estimate the effects of: (a) learning
plus possession, and (b) learning alone, relative to a control group. In the control group,
42% of individuals purchased the asset, increasing to 71% in the "social learning only"
group, and to 93% in the "social learning and social utility" group. These results suggest
that herding behavior in financial markets may result from social learning, and also from a
desire to own the same assets as one's peers.
The third chapter (co-authored with Pedro Daniel Tavares) uses data on checking and
savings accounts for a sample of clients from a large bank in Brazil to calculate the prevalence
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and cost of "borrowing high and lending low" behavior in a setting where the spread between
the borrowing and saving rates is on the order of 150% per year. We find that most clients
maintain an overdrawn account at least one day a year while having liquid assets. However,
the yearly amount of avoidable financial charges would only correspond, on average, to less
than 0.5% of clients' yearly earnings. We also show that consumers are less likely to engage
in such behavior when the costs of doing so are higher. These results suggest that the
spread between the borrowing and saving rates is a key determinant of this behavior.
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Chapter 1




High-cost consumer credit has attracted significant academic and regulatory attention. The
debate is intensified by claims that lenders conceal or misrepresent rates, which has made
interest rate disclosure a major focus for regulators1 . Even when information disclosure
regulations require that lenders present interest rates in a standardized way, lenders can
easily evade such regulations if clients have limited attention. As argued by Barr et al.
(2008), lenders can use more salient terms (for example, "Low Monthly Payments!") to
compete with the interest rate information for borrowers' attention, while still complying
with disclosure regulations. These concerns are especially relevant in emerging markets,
where consumer credit is novel and interest rates are particularly high2 . In Brazil, the
volume of credit card borrowing increased by a factor of 12 over the last 10 years, despite
the fact that credit card revolving interest rates are usually higher than 10% per month3 .
'Typical lending practices before the enactment of the Truth-in-Lending-Act are described in National
Commission on Consumer Finance (1972). There are also reports that microlenders stress weekly payments
rather than long-term interest rates, and - when pressed to report their average annual rates - misrepresent
rates by not taking into account declining balances (Business Week, 2007).
2 From 2000 to 2008, household debt as a proportion of GDP increased in all BRIC countries (Roxburgh
(2010)).
3 Brazilian Central Bank.
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In this paper, I test whether credit demand is sensitive to interest rates, to the promi-
nence of interest rate disclosure, and to nudges. In a randomized field experiment conducted
with a large credit card company in Brazil, a sample of 19,690 clients were offered a menu
of payment plans that allows them to pay down their balances over a 6-12 month period
in fixed installments, as an alternative to the revolving credit line. When offering these
contracts, credit card companies usually conceal rates in the fine print, while featuring a
long-term payment plan with low monthly payments. In the experimental design, I ran-
domly varied three features of the offer: (i) the offered interest rate: which ranged from
3.99% to 11.89% per month; (ii) the degree of interest rate disclosure: whether buried in
a footnote, or prominently disclosed; and (iii) the featured payment plan: although all
clients were offered 4 different payment plans, one plan was prominently featured in the
advertisement.
The experimental results show that most clients are surprisingly adept at decoding loan
terms, suggesting a fair amount of sophistication for this population. Clients are interest rate
elastic, even when rates are not prominently disclosed. In addition, on average, prominent
rate disclosure has only small and not statistically significant effects on take-up rates and
interest rate elasticities. However, the degree of rate disclosure is relevant for an important
subpopulation. High-risk clients are not rate-sensitive when the interest rate is concealed
in the fine print, although they become interest rate elastic when this information is more
prominently disclosed 4 . These results suggest that high-risk borrowers are less attentive
to the details of the contract, so that prominent rate disclosure affects their borrowing
decisions. However, even for the high-risk group, the financial consequences of information
disclosure are modest.
Also, clients are no more likely to enroll in a payment plan when a longer-term plan
(with lower monthly payments) is featured. This suggests that clients consider all available
options. However, conditional on enrollment, there is evidence that "nudges" are relevant
in determining which plans clients choose. Although clients revealed preferences for short-
term plans, they can be nudged into enrolling in longer-term plans when a longer-term plan
appears more prominently. However, clients are less susceptible to nudges when interest
4Risk categories are based on a borrower risk classification system used by the firm, which is based on
information supplied by credit bureaus and on the credit card company's own data. Clients are more likely to
be classified as high-risk when they have a lower credit score on credit bureaus, when they use the revolving
credit line more often, when they make late payments, and when they use a higher proportion of their credit
limit. According to this classification system, 10% of the clients are classified as high-risk.
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rates are higher and when longer-term plans are featured.
The results reported here add to a recent body of experimental and quasi-experimental
evidence in both developed and developing countries which suggests that consumers are
responsive to prices in credit markets (for example, Karlan and Zinman (2008), Gross and
Souleles (2002), Huang and Tan (2009), and Attanasio et al. (2008)). These results also
fit into a small but growing literature on credit demand and information disclosure. In
two recent randomized experiments, Bertrand et al. (2010) and Bertrand and Morse (2011)
find that presenting the interest rate of loan contracts has no effect on credit demand5 .
Unlike designs in previous research, the experimental design in this paper allows the effects
of interest rate disclosure to be estimated not only on average take-up rates, but also on
the interest rate sensitivity of demand. While my results also provide evidence that, on
average, interest rate disclosure has limited effect on take-up rates, I show that prominent
rate disclosure matters for an important group of clients - namely, high-risk clients who are
rate-sensitive only if the interest rate information is prominently disclosed. These results
are consistent with the work by Stango and Zinman (2011), who studied the effect of
weakening enforcement of APR disclosure in the Truth-in-Lending Act; they found that
weak enforcement increased the disparity between interest rates paid by more and less
sophisticated clients.
Finally, the results in this paper add to a large literature on nudges and default options
in financial decisions. The estimated effects of nudges on the probability of choosing a
specific plan are at the same order of magnitude as the effects of default options in 401(K)
decisions in the US (Beshears et al. (2009)). Note, however, that in the experiment presented
here clients had to make an active decision about in which payment plan to enroll. Still,
the display of the options had a strong influence on payment plan choices, suggesting that
consumers are susceptible to nudges even when they have to make an active decision. In
addition, this paper provides novel evidence that the effectiveness of nudges is weaker when
the stakes are higher.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the consumer credit market in
Brazil, emphasizing the details of the payment plans offered by credit card companies.
Section 1.3 describes the experimental design and the empirical strategy. The results of the
5Bertrand and Morse (2011) find that information that helps consumers aggregate the costs of payday
loans over time has a significant effect in reducing take-up rates.
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experiment are presented and discussed in Section 1.4, while section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Economic Environment
1.2.1 Credit in Brazil
The rapid growth in consumer credit has been particularly pronounced in Brazil, where
consumer credit doubled between 2000 and 2010. This increase in consumer credit in
Brazil is in part explained by an increasing access to credit cards to lower and middle class
consumers, especially through credit card companies associated with retail stores. In some
cases these cards can be used only at the originating retail store; in other cases they can
be used elsewhere. Between 2000 and 2010 the volume of credit card borrowing increased
twelve-fold, despite the fact that credit card interest rates in Brazil are particularly high.
Credit card companies in Brazil usually offer two borrowing alternatives if clients do
not pay their balance in full. The most common alternative is to use the credit card's
revolving line of credit: clients pay an amount equal to or greater than the minimum
required payment, but smaller than the credit card balance. The remaining balance plus
interest accrued is carried over to the next billing period. For the clients in this study, the
revolving rate ranges from 11.89% to 15.99% per month, and the minimum payment is equal
to 15% of the credit card balance. For the consumer, the main advantage of this source of
credit is that it is pre-approved, and clients have the flexibility to choose how much they
want to pay, as long as it is at least the minimum payment.
Many credit card companies also offer a menu of installment plans to clients. Clients
can choose a fixed period over which they can repay their entire balances with constant
monthly payments. This type of credit is also pre-approved and easily accessible. To enroll
in a payment plan, clients simply have to pay the exact amount of the monthly payment of
the plan they have chosen. In doing so, they automatically enroll in the chosen plan, and
they are charged the remaining installments on their credit card statements for the m - 1
following months. For example, if the credit card statement presents a payment plan offer
of 6 installments with a monthly payment of $183.38, the client simply has to pay exactly
$183.38, and then $183.38 will be added to his credit card balance every month for five
months.
Given a balance (B), the number of installments (m), and the monthly interest rate
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(rm), the monthly payment (Mm) is6 :
M - B X (1±rm)m-1xrmm - (1+rm)m -1
The number of installments usually ranges from 4 to 24 months, and the interest rate
may be equal to or lower than the revolving rate. When advertising a menu of payment
plans, firms usually highlight low monthly payments (in some cases lower than the minimum
payment), and advertise that these contracts have a "special interest rate" (if the payment
plan rate is lower than the revolving rate), although the contract rate is usually concealed
in the fine print. Firms offer these contracts in hopes of attracting clients that would not
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use the revolving credit line, and to lead clients to carry a larger outstanding balance
Under a payment plan contract, clients need to pay the monthly installments in full
in order to stay current. The credit card minimum payment will be equal to the monthly
installment of the chosen payment plan, plus 15% of any new purchases made with the credit
card. This implies that clients might face higher minimum payments when they enroll in
a payment plan than if they used the revolving credit line, even if the revolving credit line
has a higher interest rate.
Although there is no penalty for canceling a payment plan (if a client cancels the plan,
then the present value of the unpaid installments is charged on his next billing cycle), many
clients may not be aware of the possibility of canceling these payment plans, and may be
afraid of facing additional fees and the hassle of dealing with a bureaucracy. If clients believe
it is impossible or costly to cancel a payment plan, then a payment plan would imply a
commitment to carry a balance for a longer period. These concerns might prevent some
clients from choosing such longer-term credit offers.
Regardless of whether clients enrolled in a payment plan, in case of default or late
payments with their credit cards, the interest rate and fees are substantial. If clients do not
pay on time, then in addition to the revolving interest rate (which can be up to 15.99% per
month) they are charged a late payment fee equal to 2% of their full balance, plus interest
charges on future installments. If they remain in default for more than 70 days, their credit
6The amount of the monthly payments is defined such that, given the contract interest rate (rm), the
present value of the stream of payments is equal to the credit card balance (B).
7 However, a separate test conducted by the same firm concluded that offering payment plans with interest
rates equal to 6.39% or 9.59% would not be profitable for the firm, at least at those levels. The firm found
that most of the clients who enrolled in a payment plan would have already been revolving large balances if
they were not offered these plans, and that enrolling in a payment plan increased the probability of default.
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cards are canceled. Their names are also reported to credit bureaus, making it harder for
them to access other lines of credit.
Other borrowing alternatives for consumers include personal loans from banks (average
monthly interest rate of 4.79%), checking account overdrafts (average monthly interest rate
of 7.40%), personal loans from finance houses (average monthly interest rate of 9.87%), or
informal loans. However, these alternatives might not be available for some clients and,
even if available, may require additional applications, paperwork, and delays.
1.2.2 Borrowing Decisions, Limited Attention, and Information Disclo-
sure
When deciding whether to enroll in a payment plan or to use a revolving line of credit,
clients face a trade-off between lower interest rates and flexibility in the stream of payments:
interest rates on payment plans are usually lower than revolving credit card rates, but
payment plans have less flexibility in terms of the stream of payments clients must make.
Clients are required to pay exactly the first monthly payment in order to enroll in a payment
plan. For example, with a 6-month payment plan and an interest rate of 11.89%, this implies
paying only around 22% of their credit card balances. In addition, because clients might be
unaware of the option to cancel these contracts, they may believe they have an obligation
to carry a balance over a longer period.
In both cases, that inflexibility implies that clients might have to distort their optimal
consumption streams if they choose such a plan. It might instead be optimal for clients to
use their revolving line of credit to pay off a higher fraction of their balances, thus paying
off their debt in a shorter period, even if this means borrowing at a higher interest rate.
Past data reveals that, in the absence of payment plan offers, clients pay more than 30%
of their balances 93% of the time. Also, less than 10% of clients used the revolving line
of credit for six consecutive months. In other words, even though payment plans usually
have lower interest rates, enrolling in such plans might imply carrying a larger balance than
usual for most clients.
The lower the interest rate, the more attractive the payment plans should be for the
clients. However, figuring out whether a payment plan has an attractive interest rate may
not be a straightforward task. While information disclosure regulations in Brazil require
that credit card companies disclose information on the interest rates, this information is
14
usually hidden, increasing the computational cost of comparing payment plans and alterna-
tive options. Although a "rational" consumer would be able to calculate the interest rate on
payment plans given the number of installments and monthly payments, limited financial
literacy and cognitive biases may prevent clients from correctly evaluating contract interest
rates. In fact, there is no closed-form solution to calculate the interest rate of an installment
plan given the number of installments and the monthly payments. There is a consistent
body of evidence showing that consumers make mistakes when assessing interest rates8 , and
Stango and Zinman (2009a) provide evidence that consumers systematically underestimate
interest rates when given a other terms of the contract.
A second important decision in this setting is the maturity choice of the payment plan.
Clients are usually presented with several payment plan options, with varying numbers of
installments and monthly payments. In selecting a payment plan, clients must balance the
size of their monthly payments with the duration over which they will have to repay their
debt. The higher the interest rate, the more costly it is to choose a long-term relative to a
short-term payment plan. Therefore, it would be expected that clients choose shorter-term
contracts and make more careful decisions when the interest rates are higher.
1.3 Experimental Design and Implementation
The field experiment was carried out with a large credit card company in Brazil. The
credit cards, issued by a major retailer in Brazil, are regular credit cards, accepted in most
retail locations throughout the country. At the time of the experiment, this company had
more than 5 million active clients, most of them lower- and middle-income. Therefore, the
conclusions based on the sample analyzed in this study should be relevant for understanding
an important group of consumers: lower- and middle-income consumers that are starting
to gain access to credit in emerging markets. A sample of credit card clients was selected
to receive a menu of payment plan offers, which were varied as described below.
1.3.1 Treatments
To understand the interest rate elasticity of credit demand, in a first treatment dimension
clients were randomly assigned to groups in which the monthly interest rate of the payment
8 For example, see Juster and Shay (1964), National Commission on Consumer Finance (1972), Day and
Brandt (1974), and Parker and Shay (1974)
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plans was 3.99%, 7.49%, or 11.89%. Given the payment plan's interest rate, clients had
four different payment plan options, with the number of installments varying between 6,
8, 10, and 12 months. The Table below displays the monthly payments for each contract,
assuming a balance of $1000.00. A client with an assigned interest rate of rm would be able
to choose among any of the contracts in the corresponding column.
Contract options for a client with a balance of $1000:
Assigned i = 3.99% Assigned i = 7.49% Assigned i = 11.89%
Available choices: Available choices: Available choices:
6 x $183.38 6 x $198.14 6 x $216.70
8 x $142.77 8 x $158.77 8 x $179.22
10 x $118.50 10 x $135.47 10 x $157.47
12 x $102.40 12 x $120.21 12 x $143.55
Along with their credit card statement, clients received a one-page advertisement de-
scribing the payment plan offers.
In order to estimate how credit demand is affected by the prominence of the interest
rate disclosure, in a second treatment dimension clients were randomly chosen to receive one
of two different advertisement layouts. The standard advertisement states that the client
could pay off his balance using payment plans with a special interest rate. The advertisement
then displays an example of one of the payment plan options, saying "you can pay off your
balance of B in m installments of Mm". Figure 1 presents the one-page advertisement for
the payment plans, along with the credit card statement. In that advertisement layout, the
interest rate of the contract is not prominently disclosed and is only present in a footnote.
Clients were also shown a table with all four payment plan options at the top of their
credit card statement. In this table, one of the payment plans (the same as in the one-
page advertisement) appears more prominently, and the interest rate of the payment plans
is presented in a small font size next to the table. Therefore, clients presented with this
marketing material are encouraged to focus on the monthly payments (Mm) of the featured
plan rather than on the interest rate.
The alternative layout for the one-page advertisement is exactly the same as the standard
ad, except that the interest rate information is more prominently disclosed (Figure 2). If a
client were assigned an interest rate of 11.89%, then this layout would state that he could
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pay off his balance using payment plans with a special interest rate of 11.89% (in large font
size). The same applies for clients assigned an interest rate of 3.99% and 7.49%. Clients
who received this layout also had the same table at the top of their credit card statement
as those who received the standard layout. Even though both layouts present the same
information, the different layouts could affect clients' decisions because of limited attention,
since the value of the interest rate was more salient in the alternative layout (DellaVigna
(2009)). Since the variation in the information disclosure is orthogonal to the changes in the
interest rates, it is possible to estimate not only how information disclosure affects average
take-up rates, but also how it affects the interest rate sensitivity of demand.
Finally, in order to test the hypothesis that consumers are more attracted by low monthly
payments, in a third treatment dimension the featured plan (which is more prominently pre-
sented in the advertisement) was randomly assigned among clients. The 12-month contract
is the standard plan featured by the firm, which expects clients to focus on the plan's
monthly payments and thus be more attracted when a lower monthly payment is promi-
nent. The featured plan can also be relevant in determining which plan clients actually
choose among the menu of options. Having many options may create feelings of conflict
and indecision (for example, Shafir et al. (1993), Bertrand et al. (2010), and Iyengar et al.
(2004)). In this case, the featured plan can work as a nudge if clients use it as a "default
option" in order to avoid making a decision about which payment plan to choose.
1.3.2 Description of Experimental Sample
In this experiment, 19,690 credit card clients received a one-time menu of payment plans,
in either July or September 20109. Using a borrower risk classification system used by
the firm (based on credit bureaus and on the credit card company's own data), medium-
and high-risk clients were oversampled in order to provide more precision on the estimates
for these groups. Medium- and high-risk clients comprise, respectively, 7% and 10% of
the population. All summary statistics and estimates are weighted by the inverse of the
probability that the clients were selected so that they represent the original population. All
results are similar if sampling weights are not used.
Table 1.1 shows the sample size in each treatment cell. Table 1.2 presents the baseline
9 The credit card company only offers payment plans to clients with credit card balances greater than
R$100.00 who are not in default.
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characteristics of the final sample. The average credit card balance was R$661 (during the
experiment, the exchange rate was US$1 ~ R$1.75). In around 27% of the cases, clients
used the revolving credit line, and even conditional on using the revolving credit line,
clients pay on average 60% of their balances. These numbers are lower than the proportion
of households with outstanding credit card balances in the US, which might be because
revolving interest rates are much higher in Brazil.
Columns 2 to 4 of Table 1.2 show baseline characteristics separately for each risk category
group. According to this classification, around 10% of the clients are defined as high-risk.
Using the revolving line of credit, making late payments, and using a higher proportion of
the credit limit enter negatively in the risk assessment of the firm. Not surprisingly, these
variables are all higher for high-risk clients. Table 1.2 also reports the 12-month probability
of default for each category group' 0 . As expected, low-risk clients have a lower probability
of default (5%) than high-risk clients (22%).
Since clients were randomly assigned to each treatment group, averages for all base-
line variables are well-balanced across the different treatment cells. Appendix table 1.A.1
presents the averages for baseline variables in the final sample in each interest rate x adver-
tisement layout and suggested maturity cells, and p-values of the tests that each of these
variables has the same mean across the different treatment cells. Appendix tables 1.A.2 to
1.A.4 present the same information when low-, middle-, and high-risk clients are analyzed
separately.
1.3.3 Empirical Strategy
Given the fact that the interest rates on payment plans and the advertisement layouts
were randomly assigned, the effect of the interest rate and information disclosure on credit
demand can be estimated simply by comparing the mean take-up rate across cells. The
following linear probability model (or logit) is used to estimate the interest rate sensitivity
of demand:
E = a + -Di + #1 -ri + #2 -ri -Di + E(1.1)
'
0 This is the probability that, conditional on being current in the base month, a client does not make the
minimum payment for 70 days at some point within the following 12 months. These calculations are based
on an outside sample.
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where Ei is equal to one if client i enrolled in a payment plan, ri is the interest rate offered,
and Di is a dummy variable equal to one if client i received the alternative advertisement
with the interest rate prominently disclosed. The omitted group is clients who received
the standard advertisement layout (where the interest rate is not prominently disclosed).
Because rates were randomly assigned, 01 yields consistent estimates of the interest rate
sensitivity of the demand for payment plans when the lender conceals the interest rate
information and encourages clients to focus on low monthly payments. Because the adver-
tisement layout was also randomly assigned, 02 yields consistent estimates of the effects of
information disclosure on the interest rate sensitivity.
The interest rate elasticities under the two different advertisement layouts may then be
calculated as:
Tr,standard 1 X rstandard and r,alternative A= ( + 2) X ralternative (1.2)
Estandard Ealternative
where rlayout and Elayout are, respectively, average interest rate and take-up rates under
the standard (interest rate presented only in the fine print) or the alternative (interest
rate prominently disclosed) advertisement layout. The standard errors of br,standard and
r,alternative are bootstrapped, which takes into account the fact that the average take-up
rates also are estimated. Again, because of the random assignment of advertisement layouts,
the differences between nr,aiternative and r,standard reveal the effect of prominent interest rate
disclosure on interest rate elasticities.
Similarly, the importance of the featured plan can be estimated by comparing the mean
take-up rate across the featured plan cells. Further, the following linear probability model
(or logit) is estimated in order to test the hypothesis that demand is higher when a payment
plan with lower monthly payments is more prominently presented (while holding the menu
of options constant):
Ej = a + y x mi + 6i (1.3)
where mi is the maturity of the featured plan offered to client i. The elasticity with respect
to the maturity of the featured plan may be calculated as:
yx - (1.4)E
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where i- is the average maturity of the featured plan.
1.3.4 Experiment to Test the Effect of Payment Plan on Default
In addition to the field experiment described above, I will also rely on a larger scale field
experiment conducted by the firm at the same time, with another group of clients. The credit
card company carried out an experiment in July of 2010 with 103,116 clients, randomly
allocated in three groups. In the first group, 34, 743 clients were offered a menu of payment
plans with interest rate equal to 6.39%, in a second group, 49, 573 clients were offered plans
with interest rate equal to 9.59%, and finally a control group of 18,800 clients did not
receive any payment plan offer. This experiment was designed to measure the impact that
enrolling in a payment plan has on future repayment. The results of this experiment will
be combined with the results of my experiment in order to provide more precise estimates
of the effects of information disclosure on probability of default in section 1.4.3.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Interest Rate Elasticity and Information Disclosure
The first set of results shows the sensitivity of payment plans' demand to the interest
rates when the interest rate is concealed in a footnote (as in the standard advertisement
layout). Table 1.3, column 1, presents the payment plans' take-up rates for each interest rate
offer when the interest rate is not prominently disclosed. The results show that payment
plans' demand responds to interest rate changes. The average take-up rate is 2% when
the payment plans' interest rate is 11.89%, and it doubles when the interest rate falls to
3.99%. I strongly reject that take-up rates are equal for all interest rate values. The implied
interest rate elasticity, estimated from (1.2), is -0.713 (s.e. 0.137), negative and statistically
different from zero
The fact that clients are interest rate elastic even when the most salient information
is the monthly payments is not surprising, since payment plans with higher interest rates
have higher monthly payments. However, given the difficulties in assessing the interest rate
of an installment plan based on the number of installments and the monthly payments,
"The estimated coefficients from model (1.1) using both a linear probability model and logit are presented
in Appendix table 1.A.5.
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it is harder for consumers to compare the payment plan to other borrowing alternatives
based only on this information. Comparing the demand for payment plans under the two
different advertisements will provide evidence on whether clients are able to assess the cost
of credit based on the monthly payments (or able to look for the interest rate in the fine
print). Column 2 of Table 1.3 presents the payment plans' take-up rates when the interest
rate is prominently disclosed, while column 3 shows the difference in take-up rates when
the interest rate is prominently versus when it is not prominently disclosed.
Displaying the interest rate prominently results in an increase in take-up rates when
the interest rate is 3.99%, and a decrease in take-up rates when the interest rate is 11.89%.
However, these differences are small and not statistically different from zero. Panel ii of
Table 1.3 presents the interest rate elasticities. Clients are slightly more interest rate elastic
when the interest rate information is more prominent (the elasticity goes from -0.713 to
-0.880), but it is not possible to reject that the elasticities are equal under the two layouts.
These results suggest that, on average, clients are able to assess the cost of credit even
when the credit card company conceals the interest rate information in the fine print, leading
clients to focus on the monthly payments of the contracts. Therefore, as long as lenders are
required to disclose interest rates, regulations that prevent lenders from concealing rates in
the fine print should have, on average, small effects on consumers decisions.
1.4.2 Interest Rate Elasticity and Information Disclosure - Heterogeneity
The results for the full sample suggest that clients are sensitive to interest rate changes
and that changing the salience of the contract interest rate has a limited effect on clients'
behavior. However, these results hide an important heterogeneity when clients are classified
according to their default risk.
Columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 1.4 show payment plan take-up rates separately for low-,
medium-, and high-risk clients. The demand for payment plans increases with the risk
profile of the clients. More importantly, take-up rates are fairly constant across different
interest rates for high-risk clients. A joint test fails to reject the hypothesis that that take-
up rates are equal for all interest rates for these clients, with a p-value of 0.645. Panel ii
reports the estimated interest rate elasticity for each risk group when the interest rate is
12 Given the standard errors, it would be possible to detect an effect of prominent rate disclosure on the
interest rate elasticity of the order of 0.3.
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not prominently disclosed. Interest rate elasticity is equal to -0.884 (s.e. 0.173) for the
low-risk clients and -0.526 (s.e. 0.270) for medium-risk clients. For the high-risk clients,
though, the estimated interest rate elasticity is equal to -0.172 (s.e. 0.242), which is both
small and statistically equal to zero.
Comparing take-up rates and interest rate elasticities under the two advertisement lay-
outs for low- and medium-risk clients, we find that more prominent interest rate disclosure
has no impact on the behavior of these clients. These results are reported in columns 3 and
6 of Table 1.4. For high-risk clients, though, prominent disclosure strongly reduces payment
plans' demand when the interest rate is equal to 11.89% (from 5.7% to 2.9%), and increases
payment plans' demand when the interest rate is equal to 3.99% or 7.49% (though these
differences are not statistically significant). The interest rate elasticity for this high-risk
group changes from -0.172 (s.e. 0.242) when the interest rate is concealed to -0.929 (s.e.
0.205) when it is prominently disclosed. The hypothesis that the interest rate elasticities
are invariant to the advertisement layout for this group of clients can be rejected at the
1.7% level.
These results are consistent with low- and medium-risk clients being more careful when
choosing among different borrowing options, suggesting that such clients look for the interest
rate of contracts even when this information is not prominently displayed in the advertise-
ment. These results also suggest, however, that high-risk borrowers are less attentive to
the details of a contract, so that the salience of the interest rate actually impacts their
borrowing decisions. The behavior of high-risk clients also suggests that the experimental
manipulation produced a meaningful difference in the available information, although the
more sophisticated clients were able to work around that.
1.4.3 Effects of Information Disclosure on Subsequent Financial Out-
comes for High-Risk Clients
The results in sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 reveal that while the degree of interest rate disclosure
has, on average, small and not statistically significant effects on payment plan enrollment
decisions, it significantly affects high-risk clients decisions. In particular, high-risk clients
are 2.8 percentage points less likely to enroll in a payment plan with a high interest rate
when the interest rate information is prominently disclosed. But does this affect their
welfare or even future financial position in any meaningful way?
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While the scale of the experimental design in this paper is not sufficient to estimate
how this change in behavior translates into subsequent financial outcomes, such as default
probability1 3 , it is possible to use the larger scale experiment carried out by the same firm
described in section 1.3.4. With this larger scale experiment, it is possible to estimate the
causal effect of enrolling in a payment plan using the following specification:
Yi = a + P6.39 X E 6.39 ,i + P9.59 X E 9.59,i -I- +i (1.5)
where Y is default in the 12 months after the offer, and Er,i is equal to 1 if client i enrolled in
a payment plan with interest rate equal to r. Coefficient Pr is the causal effect of enrolling
in a payment plan with interest rate r on outcome Y. Note that this causal effect can
depend on the interest rate offered. In order to estimate P6.39 and p9.59, offers of payment
plans with rates 6.39% and 9.59% are used as instruments for payment plan enrollment at
these two rates.
The results presented in Table 1.5 indicate that, on average, enrolling in a payment plan
at either of these two interest rates significantly increase the probability of default in the
following 12 months. Considering only the high-risk clients, enrolling in a payment plan
induces more clients to default when the interest rate is higher (9.59%).
Extrapolating these results, enrolling in a payment plan with an even higher interest
rate should also increase the probability of default. Since prominent rate disclosure reduces
the demand of high-risk clients for payment plans when the interest rate is equal to 11.89%,
this information treatment likely reduces the probability of default for clients that change
their payment plan enrollment decisions because of the treatment.
Although these estimates suggest that high-risk clients who did not enroll in a payment
plan when offered the full information treatment are likely better off, another estimate
of interest is the reduced form impact of information disclosure on default probability.
Assuming that information disclosure only affects subsequent financial outcomes through
the enrollment decision, consider the model:
1 3 In a reduced form regression of information disclosure on default for high-risk clients offered a high
interest rate payment plan, the standard error on the information disclosure coefficient is equal to 2.3
percentage points. Although the estimate is not statistically different from zero, it would not be possible to
reject that information disclosure has large effects on default, given the large standard errors.
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Er,i = al + Or X Dr,i + si,i (1.6)
Y = a2 + Pr X Er,i + 6 2,i
where #r is the causal effect of information disclosure on payment plan enrollment, and pr
is the causal effect of payment plan enrollment on outcome Y. Note that these effects can
vary with r. Combining these two equations:
Yi = & + 7rr x Dri + i, where 7rr = (Or x pr) (1.7)
Therefore, the reduced form effect of prominent rate disclosure would be the product of
the effect of prominent rate disclosure on enrollment (#r) and the effect of enrollment on
the outcome variable (Pr). This strategy is similar in spirit to Angrist and Krueger (1992)
Two-Sample IV. However, instead of using estimates from the reduced form and from the
first stage in order to back out the structural parameter, the strategy used here combines
the first-stage estimates from my experiment, and the structural parameter estimates from
the firm experiment in order to produce an estimate of the reduced form. That is, the
overall effect of prominent rate disclosure on default 14 .
The first experiment provides an estimate for 011.89 (/11.89 = -0.028, s.e. 0.012),
while the second experiment provides an estimate for p9.59 (pg.59 = 0.121, s.e. 0.067).
Assuming that P9.59 P11.89, combining these two estimates yields the reduced form effect of
information disclosure on probability of default for high-risk clients ^r = (0.12) x (-0.028) =
-0.0034 (s.e. 0.0025)15. Note that the standard error is around 10 times smaller than the
standard error of the reduced form effects of prominent rate disclosure based on the main
experiment (0.25 vs 2.3 percentage points), allowing even modest effects of information
disclosure on probability of default to be ruled out.
Therefore, prominent rate disclosure has a significant effect in reducing default for clients
that are induced to enroll in a payment plan with a high rate because the interest rate
information is concealed in the fine print. However, since it affects only a small proportion
of consumers, the aggregate effect of such policy would be small even for the population of
4In contrast to Angrist and Krueger (1992) Two-Sample IV strategy, my implementation relies on the
assumption of homogeneous treatment effects. Otherwise, it might be that the estimated pr is not the
causal effect of enrolling in a payment plan for clients that change their enrollment decisions because of the
information treatment.
15 Standard error is calculated using the Delta Method.
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high-risk clients.
1.4.4 Featured plan and Maturity Choice
Similar to the treatment where the interest rate is disclosed, changing which plan is selected
to appear more prominently has no effect on the clients' choice set, and not even on the
information content that is provided to them. One hypothesis in the firm, however, is that
clients focus mostly on the monthly payments of the featured plan. In this case, take-up
rates should be higher when a payment plan with lower monthly payments/longer maturity
is featured.
Column 1 of Table 1.6 shows the take-up rates by featured plan. It is not possible
to reject the hypothesis that take-up rates do not depend on which plan is featured. In
particular, it is possible reject the hypothesis that clients are more likely to enroll in a
payment plan when a longer-term plan is more prominently presented. When clients are
analyzed separately by risk category groups, there is also no evidence that the changes in
the featured plan affect take-up rates.
The lack of demand response to changes in the featured plan does not imply, however,
that clients are indifferent with respect to the maturity of their payment plans, nor that the
plan that is selected to appear more prominently has no effect on clients' decisions. Table
1.7 presents the distribution of payment plan choices by featured plan. Clients have strong
preferences for short-term contracts. Of the clients who choose a payment plan, more then
half of them choose the 6-month plan (the shortest available maturity choice), and when the
6-month plan is featured, more than 80% of the clients choose this plan. However, when a
longer-term plan is featured, many clients continue to choose the 6-month plan, but a large
fraction of them simply follow the featured plan.
These results suggest that even when one option is more prominently presented, clients
are able to consider other alternatives if this option is not attractive. However, the payment
plan that appears more prominently has a strong influence in determining which payment
plan the clients choose. In particular, clients can be nudged into choosing longer-term plans.
Assuming that the featured plan affected which payment plan the clients chose, but
that it had no effect their decision to enroll or not in a payment plan, it is also possible to
determine if clients had worse subsequent financial outcomes because they were induced to
choose a longer-term payment plan. Given that the featured plan had no effect on take-up
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rates, and that clients who enrolled in a payment plan in each featured plan treatment cell
do not differ in terms of the baseline variables (see Appendix table 1.A.6), this seems to be
a reasonable assumption. The following model is estimated:
Yi = a + A x mi + ei (1.8)
where mi is maturity of the payment plan chosen by client i. This variable is instrumented
by a set of dummy variables indicating whether the 8-, 10-, or 12-month plan was featured
(the 6-month plan category was omitted). The results in Table 1.8 indicate that clients
induced to enroll in a longer term payment plan were more likely to default. Therefore,
the featured plan not only affects which plan clients choose, but it also has real effects on
clients' financial outcomes.
However, clients are less likely to follow the featured plan when the cost of doing so
is higher. The cost of following the featured plan relative to choosing the 6-month plan
increases with the maturity of the featured plan and with the interest rate. Table 1.9
reports estimates on how the probability of following the featured plan correlates with the
interest rate and with the maturity of the featured plan16 . Clients are less likely to follow
the featured plan when the interest rate is higher and when a longer-term plan is featured.
Combining these two dimensions, when the interest rate is high and the 12-month plan is
featured, only 20% of the clients who enroll in a payment plan follow the featured plan,
while when the interest rate is low and the 8-month featured, almost 60% of the clients
follow the featured plan. Therefore, although clients can be nudged into choosing a longer
term payment plan, this effect is less relevant when the relative cost of following the featured
plan is higher.
16 It is important to note that all of the regressions in Table 1.9 are conditional on payment plan enrollment.
Therefore, the identification assumptions in these models do not follow directly from the experimental design.
For the regressions that estimate the relationship between probability of following the featured plan and the
maturity of the featured plan, this selection problem should be less relevant. As reported above, the featured
plan has no effect on average take-up rates. Also, there is no evidence that, conditional on payment plan
take-up, clients differ in terms of the baseline variables presented in Table 1.2 (see Table A6). This problem
can be more relevant for the interest rate regressions. Since clients are interest rate elastic, clients who enroll
in a payment plan when the interest rate is high are different from clients who enroll when the interest rate is
low. In order to mitigate this problem, I include all the baseline variables in Table 1.2 as controls variables.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper., I test whether lenders are in -fact able to exploit clients' limited attention
through advertisement strategies that conceal the interest rate and induce clients to focus
on low monthly payments. The results presented here indicate that, overall, these strategies
have small and not statistically significant effects on clients' choices. On average, Brazilian
credit card holders are sensitive to the interest rate even when interest rate information is
not prominently disclosed, and making this information more salient has only a small and
not statistically significant effect on take-up rates and interest rate sensitivity. Also, the
firm is not able to attract more clients to enroll in payment plans by featuring a payment
plan with lower monthly payments (and longer maturity), which again suggests that clients
are sophisticated in considering all the available information.
The results in this paper also demonstrate the importance of considering the possibilities
of heterogeneous effects of information disclosure by borrower risk. While the effects of
interest rate disclosure are, on average, small and not statistically significant., it has a
significant effect on credit demand decisions for an important population. High-risk clients
are not sensitive to the interest rate when the information is concealed in the fine print, but
they become interest rate elastic when the interest rate is prominently disclosed. However,
even though information disclosure reduces the probability of default for high-risk clients
who avoid a high interest rate payment plan when the interest rate information is prominent,
the aggregate effects of information disclosure are small even for the pool of high-risk clients.
Overall, these results suggest that, as long as lenders are required to present interest
rates, most consumers are adept at decoding this information, even when lenders try to
obfuscate the interest rate information by making it less salient. Furthermore, even though
the degree of information disclosure affects the decisions of high-risk clients, regulating
how lenders must disclose the information would have only small effects on consumers'
subsequent financial positions, even if such regulation is targeted for this group of clients.
Therefore, these results suggest that the benefits of regulating the way that interest rate
information must be disclosed to consumers are unlikely to outweigh its compliance and
enforcement costs.
Finally, conditional on enrollment, there is evidence that consumers can be nudged into
enrolling in longer-term payment plans. Although clients are apparently able to consider
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all their options, a large fraction of them simply follow the plan that is more prominently
presented. This is consistent with clients following the featured plan in order to avoid
making a decision about which payment plan to choose, suggesting that clients might face a
high cost of deciding between alternatives. In this case, default options and nudges can have
a strong influence in shaping consumers decisions, and therefore should be on the radar of
consumer credit regulators. However, consumers are less susceptible to such nudges when
the decision involves higher stakes, which implies that the effects of nudges are limited.
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L.A Appendix: Figures and Tables
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Figure 1-1: Standard Layout (Interest Rate Concealed in the Fine Print)
I
S6 com i n vc financia o saldo de seu extrato em
pagamentos mensals fixos.
Aproveitel Parcele sua fatura corn urna taxa de juros especial
Confira o plano de 12 meses:
P m r i a n129 19
Pa mais jnformac~es. ligu pars a nossa Central de Atendimento.
Li~
ft TAM ~~
. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ..l  .
40II 9-0EIIIIIInhI
At the top of the page on the left, the advertisement says that the client can have more time to pay off
his balance. The text below the pictures says that, with this contract, the client could finance his credit card
balance in fixed monthly payments with a special interest rate. The orange box features the 12-month plan,
saying that the client could pay off his balance of R$900.00 in 12 installments of R$129.19. The footnote
states that the interest rate of this contract is 11.89% per month.
The page on the right is the credit card statement. On the top of this page, there is a red box stating
that the client can pay off his balance in up to 12 fixed installments. In this box, the client is presented with
all 4 payment plan options, although one plan is featured. The interest rate of the contract is presented in
a small font size.
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Figure 1-2: Alternative Layout (Interest Rate Prominently Disclosed)
RlIIII
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56 com o voct financia o saldo de seu extrato em
pagamentos mensais fixos.
Aproveitel Parcele sua fatura corn uma taxa de juros especial de 11,89% a.m.l
Confira o piano de 12 meses:
Rp -9
Para mais informacoes. ligue para a nossa Central de Atendimento.
DMONSTRATIVO DE moMmwrAAO
.. .. .  .. .. .. .. ..e ....... ... ..... .... -... ..... . . - - -
409-l
R$ R $ R $ R
The one-page advertisement is the same as the one in Figure 1, except that the main text says that the
client could finance his credit card balance in fixed monthly payments with a special interest rate of 11.89%.
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Table 1.1: Sample Size by Treatment Cells
Featured plan
Interest Prominent rate
rate disclosure? 6 8 10 12 Total
No 842 826 801 824 3293
3.99% Yes 789 817 785 802 3193
Total 1631 1643 1586 1626 6486
No 833 855 828 796 3312
7.49% Yes 800 803 807 819 3229
Total 1633 1658 1635 1615 6541
No 797 833 864 828 3322
11.89% Yes 867 802 834 838 3341
Total 1664 1635 1698 1666 6663
No 2472 2514 2493 2448 9927
Total Yes 2456 2422 2426 2459 9763
Total 4928 4936 4919 4907 19690
Notes: includes clients who received the payment plan offers (that
is, clients with credit card balances greater than R$100.00 who are
not in default), and received either the standard or the alternative
advertisement layouts presented in Figures 1 and 2.
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Credit card limit (R$)
Credit card balance (R$)
Probability of using the revolving
credit line
Average revolving balance
(proportion of current balance)
Average monthly interest and fees
charges (R$)
Probability of making a late
payment
Time with the credit card (years)
12-month probability of default
Sample size




the final sample of 19,690 clients offered
payment plans with the standard or alternative layouts. All summary statistics are weighted
by the inverse of the probability that the client was selected so that they represent the original
population. Standard deviations in brackets. During the experiment, the exchange rate was
US$ 1~ R$1.75. Probability of default is the probability that, conditional on being current
in the base month, a client does not make the minimum payment for 70 days at some point









































































i. Take-up rates by interest rate
All 0.029 0.031 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Interest rate = 3.99% 0.042 0.046 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Interest rate = 7.49% 0.026 0.028 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Interest rate = 11.89% 0.020 0.019 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
p-value (equal for all interest rates) 0.000 0.000
ii. Interest rate elasticities
Interest rate elasticity -0.713*** -0.880***
(0.137) (0.132)
p-value (elasticities are equal) 0.381
N 9927 9763
Notes: panel i presents the take-up rates for each interest rate cell and a p-value
of an F-test that average take-up rates are equal for all interest rate cells when
the interest rate is hidden (column 1) and when the interest rate is emphasized
(column 2). Column 3 presents the differences in take-up rates when the interest
rate was emphasized and when it was hidden, and for each interest rate groups.
Panel ii reports the interest rate elasticities when the interest rate is hidden
and when it is emphasized, along with the p-value of a test that these two
elasticities are equal. The interest rate elasticities are calculated based on a
Linear Probability Model, using equation 2. All estimates are weighted by the
inverse of the probability that the client was selected so that they represent the
original population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For column 3 and
panel ii: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.4: Effects of Interest Rate and Interest Rate Disclosure on Payment Plan Demand - Risk Category Heterogeneity
Low-risk Medium-risk High-risk
Prominent rate Prominent rate Prominent rate
disclosure? disclosure? disclosure?
No Yes Diff No Yes Diff No Yes Diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
i. Take-up rates
All 0.025 0.026 0.002 0.041 0.045 0.004 0.059 0.057 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Interest rate = 3.99% 0.038 0.041 0.003 0.052 0.062 0.010 0.067 0.079 0.012
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Interest rate = 7.49% 0.021 0.023 0.002 0.039 0.034 -0.005 0.054 0.064 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
Interest rate = 11.89% 0.015 0.016 0.000 0.030 0.038 0.007 0.057 0.029 -0.028**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012)
p-value (equal for all interest rates) 0.000 0.000 0.210 0.090 0.645 0.000
ii. Interest rate elasticities
Interest rate elasticity -0.884*** -0.927*** -0.526* -0.514* -0.172 -0.929***
(0.173) (0.170) (0.270) (0.293) (0.242) (0.205)
p-value (elasticities are equal) 0.860 0.976 0.017
N 6723 6581 1596 1611 1608 1571
Notes: panel i presents the take-up rates for each interest rate cell and a p-value of an F-test that average take-up rates are equal for
all interest rate cells when the interest rate is hidden and when the interest rate is emphasized for each risk category group. Panel ii
reports the interest rate elasticities when the interest rate is hidden and when it is emphasized. along with the p-value of a test that these
two elasticities are equal for each category group. The interest rate elasticities are calculated based on a Linear Probability Model. using
equation 2. All estimates are weighted by the inverse of the probability that the client was selected so that they represent the original
population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For columns 3, 6. 9. and panel ii: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *
significant at 1%
Table 1.5: Causal Effects of Enrolling in a Payment Plan on Probability of Default
Full Sample Low-risk Medium-risk High-risk
Reduced 2SLS Reduced 2SLS Reduced 2SLS Reduced 2SLS
Form Form Form Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Offered i=6.39% 0.004 0.006* 0.007 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Offered i=9.59% 0.006** 0.006** -0.001 0.012*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Accepted i=6.39% 0.065 0.101* 0.071 -0.025
(0.040) (0.057) (0.078) (0.058)
Accepted i=9.59% 0.114** 0.140** -0.014 0.121*
(0.048) (0.071) (0.094) (0.067)
Control mean 0.085 0.057 0.132 0.208
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
N 103114 57934 18930 26250
Notes: this table presents the reduced form and 2SLS estimates of the main effect of enrolling in a payment
plan on the probability of default in the following 12 months. using the larger scale experiment carried out by
the firm. All estimates are weighted by the inverse of the probability that the client was selected so that they
represent the original population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 1.6: Payment Plan Take-up Rates by Featured Plan
Risk categories
Full Sample Low-risk Medium-risk High-risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
i. Take-up rates by featured plan
All 0.030 0.026 0.043 0.058
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Featured plan = 6-month 0.030 0.025 0.046 0.059
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
Featured plan 8-month 0.032 0.028 0.036 0.062
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
Featured plan 10-month 0.030 0.026 0.049 0.053
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
Featured plan = 12-month 0.028 0.023 0.040 0.057
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
p-value (equal for all featured 0.667 0.675 0.543 0.902
plans)
ii. Elasticities with respect to the maturity of the featured plan
Maturity elasticity -0.130 -0.138 -0.048 -0.127
(0.168) (0.201) (0.350) (0.286)
Notes: column 1 presents take-up rates by featured plan and elasticity with respect to
the maturity of the featured plan for the full sample. Elasticity is calculated based on
equation 4. The p-value presented in column 1 is of an F-test that take-up rates are the
same for all featured plans. Columns 2 to 4 present the same information separately for
the low-, medium-, and high-risk clients. All estimates are weighted by the inverse of the
probability that the client was selected so that they represent the original population.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *
significant at 1%
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able 1.7: Payment Plan Take-up Rates by Featured Plan
Featured Payment Plan
6 8 10 12
6 83.47% 37.45% 41.79% 47.91%
Payment 8 4.85% 50.32% 12.20% 9.04%
Plan
Choice 10 5.18% 6.20% 37.64% 8.72%
12 6.50% 6.03% 8.37% 34.33%
Notes: this table presents the distribution of payment plan
choices for each featured plan group. Sample is conditioned on
clients who enrolled in a payment plan.
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Table 1.8: Payment Plan Take-up Rates
First Stage
(1)
Featured plan = 8 0.863***
(0.172)
Featured plan = 10





















Notes: this table presents the 2SLS estimates of the effects of enrolling in a
longer-term payment plan on the 12-month probability of default. Sample
is restricted to clients that enrolled in a payment plan. Observations are
weighted by the inverse of the probability that the client was sampled. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.9: When are clients More Likely to Follow the Featured Plan?
Dependent variable: Followed the Featured Plan
Independent variable: Maturity of the Featured Plan Interest rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean 0.503
(featured plan = 8) (0.041)
Featured plan = 10 -0.127** -0.128**
(0.058) (0.059)
Featured plan = 12 -0.160*** -0.155***
(0.059) (0.059)
Maturity of the featured -0.041*** -0.039***
plan (0.015) (0.015)
Mean 0.564
(interest rate = 3.99%) (0.030)
Interest rate = 7.49% -0.081* -0.081
(0.049) (0.050)





Include controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 494 494 494 494 662 662 662 662
Notes: In all regressions, sample is restricted for clients who enrolled in a payment plan. Columns 1 to 4 report the correlations between probability
of following the featured plan and the maturity of the featured plan. Columns 1 and 2 reports coefficients of a LPM with dummies for featured plan
equal to 10 and 12 (omitted category is featured plan equal to 8, clients with featured plan equal to 6 were excluded). In the regressions 3 and 4, the
maturity of the featured plan enters linearly in the LPM. Columns 5 to 8 report the correlations between probability of following the featured plan
and the interest rate. Control variables include all variables in Table 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 1.A.1: Randomization Balance
Credit Credit Prob. of Average Monthly Prob. of Time with Medium- High-
card card using revolved interest making a the credit risk risk
limit balance revolving balance and fees late card
credit charges payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
i. Interest rate x advertisement layout
Concealed interest rate
3.99% 1,471.3 644.2 0.265 0.122 17.6 0.162 4.60 0.067 0.093
(37.6) (17.7) (0.005) (0.003) (0.8) (0.003) (0.07) (0.003) (0.004)
7.49% 1,444.2 634.6 0.270 0.128 17.6 0.160 4.57 0.070 0.096
(40.7) (19.1) (0.005) (0.003) (0.7) (0.003) (0.07) (0.003) (0.004)
11.89% 1,577.0 691.7 0.269 0.124 17.5 0.160 4.66 0.061 0.096
(43.4) (18.2) (0.005) (0.003) (0.6) (0.003) (0.07) (0.003) (0.004)
Prominent interest rate
3.99% 1,511.4 654.5 0.259 0.121 17.1 0.156 4.69 0.068 0.095
(41.6) (15.6) (0.005) (0.003) (0.7) (0.003) (0.08) (0.003) (0.004)
7.49% 1,570.4 668.4 0.260 0.122 17.4 0.160 4.69 0.066 0.090
(44.0) (20.7) (0.005) (0.003) (0.7) (0.003) (0.08) (0.003) (0.004)
11.89% 1,509.0 671.7 0.266 0.124 17.7 0.162 4.71 0.069 0.098
(42.6) (17.1) (0.005) (0.003) (0.7) (0.003) (0.08) (0.003) (0.004)
p-value (all
averages 0.160 0.274 0.622 0.598 0.990 0.840 0.731 0.240 0.792
are equal)
ii. Featured plan
6-month 1,491.1 665.7 0.263 0.123 17.7 0.165 4.59 0.067 0.094
(34.0) (15.3) (0.004) (0.002) (0.6) (0.003) (0.06) (0.002) (0.003)
8-month 1,543.8 667.8 0.260 0.124 17.5 0.161 4.65 0.065 0.098
(35.6) (16.8) (0.004) (0.002) (0.6) (0.003) (0.06) (0.002) (0.003)
10-month 1,533.0 644.4 0.270 0.125 17.7 0.161 4.68 0.068 0.094
(33.6) (12.4) (0.004) (0.002) (0.5) (0.003) (0.06) (0.002) (0.003)
12-month 1,487.9 666.0 0.267 0.122 17.0 0.154 4.68 0.067 0.092
(32.8) (14.4) (0.004) (0.002) (0.6) (0.003) (0.06) (0.002) (0.003)
p-value (all
averages 0.552 0.553 0.332 0.775 0.828 0.046 0.729 0.819 0.665
are equal)
N 19690 19690 19690 19690 19690 19690 19690 19690 19690
Notes: each column presents averages of the corresponding variable for each treatment cell. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. For each column, the p-value of an F-test that the mean the corresponding variable is the same for
all treatment groups is presented. All estimates are weighted by the inverse of the probability that the client was
selected so that they represent the original population.
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Table 1.A.2: Randomization Balance - Low-risk Clients
Credit Credit Prob. of Average Monthly Prob. of Time with
card card using revolved interest making a the credit
limit balance revolving balance and fees late card
credit charges payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
i. Interest rate x advertisement layout
Concealed interest rate
3.99% 1,613.6 657.5 0.227 0.094 13.9 0.141 4.77
(44.0) (20.6) (0.006) (0.003) (0.9) (0.004) (0.08)
7.49% 1,595.5 651.5 0.234 0.103 14.4 0.140 4.75
(48.1) (22.4) (0.006) (0.003) (0.7) (0.004) (0.09)
11.89% 1,729.6 708.0 0.234 0.097 13.7 0.139 4.82
(50.7) (20.9) (0.006) (0.003) (0.6) (0.004) (0.09)
Prominent interest rate
3.99% 1,662.5 672.4 0.221 0.093 13.3 0.131 4.84
(48.9) (18.1) (0.006) (0.003) (0.7) (0.004) (0.09)
7.49% 1,736.4 684.7 0.226 0.096 14.1 0.140 4.87
(51.5) (24.0) (0.006) (0.003) (0.7) (0.004) (0.09)
11.89% 1,670.0 692.8 0.230 0.096 14.2 0.140 4.89
(50.3) (19.9) (0.006) (0.003) (0.7) (0.004) (0.09)
p-value (all
averages 0.219 0.395 0.636 0.277 0.892 0.399 0.837
are equal)
ii. Featured plan
6-month 1,605.8 669.9 0.224 0.092 13.0 0.141 4.67
(54.4) (25.8) (0.007) (0.003) (0.7) (0.004) (0.10)
8-month 1,640.4 673.7 0.220 0.097 13.8 0.143 4.69
(56.9) (26.8) (0.007) (0.003) (1.0) (0.004) (0.10)
10-month 1,652.3 644.4 0.241 0.102 14.3 0.144 4.78
(52.1) (20.0) (0.007) (0.003) (0.7) (0.004) (0.10)
12-month 1,690.6 703.6 0.243 0.101 15.0 0.131 4.99
(56.9) (25.3) (0.007) (0.004) (0.9) (0.004) (0.11)
p-value (all
averages 0.757 0.332 0.038 0.153 0.340 0.123 0.105
are equal)
N 13304 13304 13304 13304 13304 13304 13304
Notes: sample conditioned on low-risk clients. Each column presents averages of the corre-
sponding variable for each treatment cell. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For each
column, the p-value of an F-test that the mean the corresponding variable is the same for all
treatment groups is presented. All estimates are weighted by the inverse of the probability
that the client was selected so that they represent the original population.
44
Table 1.A.3: Randomization Balance - Medium-risk Clients
Credit Credit Prob. of Average Monthly Prob. of Time with
card card using revolved interest making a the credit
limit balance revolving balance and fees late card
credit charges payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
i. Interest rate x advertisement layout
Concealed interest rate
3.99% 730.0 585.9 0.385 0.194 25.5 0.239 3.78
(42.0) (32.9) (0.013) (0.008) (2.2) (0.009) (0.13)
7.49% 713.1 600.2 0.376 0.182 24.4 0.230 3.68
(40.6) (38.7) (0.013) (0.008) (1.8) (0.009) (0.12)
11.89% 837.4 629.2 0.379 0.194 25.8 0.241 3.84
(59.5) (39.5) (0.014) (0.008) (2.0) (0.009) (0.14)
Prominent interest rate
3.99% 789.2 576.7 0.379 0.187 27.0 0.273 3.93
(60.3) (31.6) (0.014) (0.008) (2.3) (0.010) (0.15)
7.49% 749.8 590.3 0.357 0.185 25.0 0.247 3.69
(49.8) (37.5) (0.013) (0.008) (1.8) (0.009) (0.13)
11.89% 785.6 636.3 0.379 0.196 27.0 0.236 3.91
(54.9) (44.2) (0.013) (0.008) (2.3) (0.009) (0.13)
p-value (all
averages 0.552 0.848 0.746 0.770 0.936 0.036 0.674
are equal)
ii. Featured plan
6-month 669.2 572.2 0.398 0.197 25.9 0.245 3.76
(44.8) (36.5) (0.016) (0.009) (2.2) (0.011) (0.14)
8-month 789.5 578.1 0.377 0.190 24.2 0.229 3.62
(54.6) (35.0) (0.016) (0.010) (2.1) (0.010) (0.15)
10-month 827.2 684.8 0.375 0.192 26.6 0.240 3.84
(67.0) (56.8) (0.015) (0.009) (2.6) (0.010) (0.16)
12-month 745.0 581.4 0.371 0.179 24.3 0.232 3.84
(49.7) (38.6) (0.015) (0.009) (2.4) (0.010) (0.15)
p-value (all
averages 0.171 0.364 0.597 0.567 0.862 0.674 0.700
are equal)
N 3207 3207 3207 3207 3207 3207 3207
Notes: sample conditioned on medium-risk clients. Each column presents averages of the
corresponding variable for each treatment cell. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For
each column, the p-value of an F-test that the mean the corresponding variable is the same
for all treatment groups is presented. All estimates are weighted by the inverse of the
probability that the client was selected so that they represent the original population.
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Table 1.A.4: Randomization Balance - High-risk Clients
Credit Credit Prob. of Average Monthly Prob. of Time with
card card using revolved interest making a the credit
limit balance revolving balance and fees late card
credit charges payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
i. Interest rate x advertisement layout
Concealed interest rate
3.99% 719.3 566.1 0.523 0.325 44.5 0.296 3.64
(51.8) (32.8) (0.014) (0.010) (3.6) (0.010) (0.13)
7.49% 663.2 513.8 0.505 0.310 40.7 0.289 3.63
(47.4) (31.3) (0.013) (0.010) (2.7) (0.009) (0.13)
11.89% 701.4 587.7 0.516 0.319 45.8 0.296 3.78
(45.5) (36.3) (0.013) (0.010) (3.1) (0.009) (0.14)
Prominent interest rate
3.99% 703.7 553.4 0.506 0.320 43.4 0.292 3.82
(42.7) (29.6) (0.013) (0.010) (2.8) (0.010) (0.15)
7.49% 616.4 572.6 0.512 0.321 42.2 0.283 3.72
(32.1) (36.0) (0.014) (0.010) (3.0) (0.010) (0.14)
11.89% 650.0 517.9 0.492 0.308 41.3 0.295 3.71
(39.9) (23.0) (0.014) (0.010) (3.2) (0.009) (0.13)
p-value (all
averages 0.417 0.436 0.699 0.807 0.837 0.920 0.911
are equal)
ii. Featured plan
6-month 741.2 605.6 0.504 0.313 46.9 0.290 3.59
(65.0) (46.3) (0.015) (0.011) (4.7) (0.010) (0.16)
8-month 737.3 547.7 0.523 0.327 43.0 0.295 3.76
(56.4) (29.5) (0.015) (0.011) (2.6) (0.011) (0.15)
10-month 662.6 537.7 0.504 0.317 43.3 0.289 3.69
(53.3) (37.7) (0.016) (0.012) (3.3) (0.011) (0.16)
12-month 635.6 534.5 0.526 0.314 41.7 0.299 3.70
(46.9) (41.1) (0.015) (0.011) (3.8) (0.011) (0.15)
p-value (all
averages 0.408 0.640 0.615 0.781 0.855 0.892 0.896
are equal)
N 3179 3179 3179 3179 3179 3179 3179
Notes: sample conditioned on high-risk clients. Each column presents averages of the
corresponding variable for each treatment cell. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For
each column, the p-value of an F-test that the mean the corresponding variable is the same
for all treatment groups is presented. All estimates are weighted by the inverse of the
probability that the client was selected so that they represent the original population.
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dummy for emphasized advertisement, and the interaction of these two variables. All models
include payment day fixed effects. Panel ii presents logit marginal effects. Column 1 presents
estimates for the full sample, while columns 2 to 4 present estimates separately for low-, medium-
. and high-risk clients. All estimates are weighted by the inverse of the probability that the client
was selected so that they represent the original population. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



















Table 1.A.6: Covariates Balance Across Featured Plans Conditional on Take-up
Credit Credit Prob. of Average Monthly Prob. of Time with Medium- High-
card card using revolved interest making a the credit risk risk
limit balance revolving balance and fees late card
credit charges payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Featured Plan
6-month 1,249.9 1,057.2 0.479 0.279 46.6 0.159 4.21 0.103 0.188
(138.1) (97.0) (0.027) (0.018) (5.0) (0.014) (0.34) (0.017) (0.027)
8-month 1,690.6 1,315.0 0.480 0.283 45.0 0.152 4.70 0.073 0.189
(175.2) (245.8) (0.028) (0.019) (4.9) (0.014) (0.33) (0.014) (0.026)
10-month 1,686.7 1,211.7 0.516 0.282 48.1 0.165 4.86 0.112 0.168
(207.1) (144.2) (0.027) (0.017) (5.5) (0.014) (0.34) (0.018) (0.026)
12-month 1,394.3 930.0 0.499 0.280 41.5 0.183 4.48 0.097 0.190
(171.7) (83.9) (0.028) (0.019) (4.7) (0.015) (0.29) (0.018) (0.028)
p-value (all
averages 0.147 0.221 0.731 0.999 0.810 0.481 0.553 0.314 0.921
are equal)
N 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 662
Notes: each column presents averages of the corresponding variable for each treatment cell, conditional on
payment plan enrollment. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For each column, the p-value of an F-test that
the mean the corresponding variable is the same for all treatment groups is presented. All estimates are weighted
by the inverse of the probability that the client was selected so that they represent the original population.
Chapter 2
Understanding Peer Effects in
Financial Decisions: Evidence from
a Field Experiment*
2.1 Introduction
People's choices often look like the choices made by those around them: we wear what is
fashionable, we "have what they're having," and we try to "keep up with the Joneses." Such
peer effects have been analyzed across several fields of economics and social psychology. 1
An especially active area of research has examined the role of peers in financial decisions;
beyond studying whether peers affect financial decisions, different channels through which
peer effects work have generated their own literatures linking peer effects to investment
decisions, and to financial market instability. Models of herding and asset-price bubbles,
This chapter is co-authored with Leonardo Bursztyn, Florian Ederer, and Noam Yuchtman.
'In the economics literature, theoretical models of herding and social learning include Banerjee (1992)
and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). Becker (1991) studies markets in which a consumer's demand for a product
depends on the aggregate demand for the good. Empirical work has studied a wide range of contexts:
the impact of classmates or friends on education, compensation, and other outcomes Sacerdote (2001);
Duflo et al. (2011); Card and Giuliano (2011); Shue (2012); the impact of one's peers and community on
social indicators Bertrand et al. (2000); Kling et al. (2007); Bobonis and Finan (2009); Dahl et al. (2012);
and, the impact of coworkers on workplace performance Guryan et al. (2009); Mas and Moretti (2009).
Durlauf (2004) surveys the literature on neighborhood effects. Within the social psychology literature,
Asch (1951) studied individuals' conformity to group norms; Festinger (1954) posited that one resolves
uncertainty by learning from others; Burnkrant and Cousineau (1975) distinguished between "informational"
and "normative" reasons for conformity.
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potentially based on very little information, focus on learning from peers' choices. 2 Models
in which individuals' relative income or consumption concerns drive their choice of asset
holdings, and artificially drive up some assets' prices, focus on peers' possession of an asset
(and consequent income or consumption). 3
Identifying the causal effect of one's peers' behavior on one's own is notoriously difficult. 4
Correlations in the investment or consumption choices of socially-related individuals might
arise without any causal peer effect: for example, peers select into social groups, and this
might generate correlated choices; peers share common environments (and changes in those
environments), and this, too, might generate correlated choices. In the context of financial
decisions, experimental work surmounting these challenges has been done by Duflo and Saez
(2003) and Beshears et al. (2011), among others.
Equally difficult is identifying why one's consumption or investment choices have a social
component.' Broadly, there are two reasons why a peer's act of purchasing an asset (or
product, more generally) would affect one's own choice:
1. One infers that assets (or products) purchased by others are of higher quality; we refer
to this as social learning.6
2. One's utility from possessing an asset (or product) depends directly on the possession
of that asset (or product) by another individual; we call this social utility.
Suppose an investor i considers purchasing a financial asset under uncertainty. In canon-
ical models of herding based on social learning (e.g., Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et
al. (1992)), information that a peer, investor j, purchased the asset will provide favorable
information about the asset to investor i: investor j would only have purchased the asset if
2See for instance Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) and Chari and Kehoe (2004). Social learning has also
been studied experimentally in a laboratory setting by Celen and Kariv (2004).3Preferences over relative consumption can arise from the (exogenous) presence of other individuals'
consumption decisions in one's utility function, (e.g. Abel (1990), Gali (1994), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999)) or can arise endogenously when one consumes scarce consumption goods, the prices of which depend
on the incomes (and consumption and investment decisions) of other individuals (DeMarzo et al. (2004),
DeMarzo et al. (2008)).
4An early, thorough discussion of the challenge of identifying causal peer effects is found in Manski (1993).
Unsurprisingly, the empirical evidence of peer effects in financial markets has typically been correlational
(e.g., Hong et al. (2005), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007), and Li (2009)).
5 fBanerjee et al. (2011) study the diffusion of microfinance through social networks, and structurally
estimate the importance of different potential channels linking peers' decisions. Cooper and Rege (2011)
attempt to distinguish among peer effect channels in the lab.6Identifying social learning alone is the focus of Cai et al. (2009) and Moretti (2011); they try to rule out
the importance of peer effects through other channels (e.g., joint consumption) in the contexts they study.
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he observed a relatively good signal of the asset's return.7 The favorable information con-
veyed by investor j's revealed preference increases the probability that investor i purchases
the asset. relative to making a purchase decision without observing his peer's decision.8
In our study, we focus on social learning arising only from the information one acquires
from the fact that one's peer purchased a financial product. We abstract away from the
additional information one might acquire after a peer's purchase (e.g., by talking to the
peer and learning about the quality of a product) and from any change in behavior due
to increased salience of a product when consumed by one's peers. 9 The impact of learning
from a peer's purchase decision is the social learning channel.
Typically, investor j's decision to purchase the asset will also imply that investor j
possesses the asset. If investor j's possession of the asset directly affects investor i's utility
of owning the same asset, then observing investor j purchasing the asset (implying investor
j's possession of the asset) can increase the likelihood that investor i purchases the asset
for reasons other than social learning.
In this work, we pool together individuals' concerns about relative income or consump-
tion ("keeping up with the Joneses")., greater utility from joint consumption of a good,
etc. 10 The impact of a peer's possession of an asset on an individual's utility derived from
owning the same asset (for multiple reasons) is the social utility channel.
A comparison of investor i's investment when no peer effect is present to the case in
which he observes investor j purchasing an asset will generally identify the combined social
learning and social utility channels. To disentangle social learning from social utility, one
needs to identify, or create, a context in which investor j's decision to purchase an asset is
decoupled from investor j's possession of the asset (in Appendix 2.B we present a formal
model of peer effects in financial decisions that features both the social learning and social
7 We assume that investor j here made a choice in isolation, i.e., without peer effects.
8 Avery and Zemsky (1998) present a model in which information based herds do not occur, due to price
adjustments; however, in our setting there is no asset price adjustment (see also Chari and Kehoe (2004)).
9The asset sold in our field experiment was designed to make this abstraction possible. This is discussed
in detail in Section 2.1.
1 0Note that even in the absence of truly "social" preferences, one might observe greater demand for an
asset simply because a peer holds it: for example, this might arise as a result of competition over scarce
consumption goods. Because we do not wish to abuse the term, "social preferences," we prefer the broader
term, "social utility," which will include social preferences, as well as general equilibrium-induced differences
in demand. Note also that in principle, social utility might lead to negative correlations between peers'
choices (see Clark and Oswald (1998)), but we focus here on the case of positive social utility effects, as
these are predominant in the literature on peer effects in financial decisions. Evidence consistent with
individuals caring about relative outcomes has been presented by Luttmer (2005), Fliessbach et al. (2007),
and Card et al. (2010), among others.
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utility channels).
Disentangling the channels through which peer effects impact financial decisions is of
more than academic interest. Identifying causal effects of the individual channels can pro-
vide important evidence on the sources of herding behavior in financial markets. For exam-
ple, finding a causal effect of the social learning channel suggests that information provision
can limit herding based on little actual information. On the other hand, if there is evidence
for herding driven by factors other than social learning, improved information provision will
not eliminate correlated choices among peers.
Our experimental design represents an attempt to surmount both the challenge of iden-
tifying a causal peer effect, and the challenge of separately identifying the effects of social
learning and social utility. Working closely with us, a large financial brokerage in Brazil
offered a new financial asset., designed exclusively for our experiment, to pairs of clients
who share a social relationship (either friends or family members)." The stakes were high:
minimum investments were R$2.000 (over $1,000 U.S. dollars at the time of the study),
around 50% of the median investor's monthly income in our sample; furthermore, investors
were not allowed to convert existing investments with the brokerage to purchase the asset
and thus were required to allocate new resources.
To identify any sort of peer effect on investment decisions, we randomly informed one
member of the peer pair (investor 2) of the investment made by the other member of the
pair (investor 1).12 To disentangle the effect of investor l's possession from the effect of
the information conveyed by investor 1's revealed preference (his decision to purchase the
asset), we exploit a novel aspect of our experimental design. The financial brokerage with
which we worked implemented a lottery to determine whether individuals who chose to
purchase the asset would actually be allowed to make the investment (see Figure 2-1 for a
graphical depiction of the experimental design).13 Thus, half of the investor 1's who chose
to purchase the asset revealed a preference for the financial asset, but did not possess it.
Among investor l's who chose to purchase the asset, we implemented a second, indepen-
"The experimental design is discussed in more detail in Section 2. In particular, we describe the sample
of investors, the characteristics of the financial asset, as well as the details of the experimental treatments.1 2 The assignment to the roles of investor 1 and investor 2 was random.
13 Individuals understood that their decisions to purchase the asset might not be implemented. We do
not believe that the investors made their decisions lightly: take-up rates in the brokerage's pilot sale of the
asset (where no lottery was used) were similar to those in the control (no information about one's peer)
condition in this study. Furthermore, purchase decisions that were confirmed by the lottery were actually
implemented.
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dent randomization to determine the information received by the associated investor 2's: we
randomly assigned investor 2 to receive either no information about investor l's investment
decision, or to receive information about both the investment decision and the outcome of
the lottery determining possession. Thus, among investor l's who chose to purchase the
asset, the associated investor 2's were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (1) no
information about investor l's decision14 ; (2) information that investor 1 made a decision
to purchase the asset, but was not able to consummate the purchase (so learning occurred
without possession15 ); and, (3) information that investor 1 made a decision to purchase the
asset, and was able to consummate the purchase (so learning occurred, along with pos-
session).1 A comparison of choices made by investor 2 in conditions (1) and (2) reveals
the effect of social learning; a comparison of (3) and (2) reveals the impact of investor 1's
possession of the asset over and above the information conveyed by his purchase17; a com-
parison of (3) and (1) reveals the total effect of these two channels. This design allows us to
cleanly identify contributions of social learning and social utility in generating the overall
peer effects we observe. 18
Our experimental evidence suggests that both channels through which peer effects work
are important. Among investor 2's whose peer chose to purchase the asset we find the
following: individuals in the no information control condition chose to purchase the asset
at a rate of around 42%; among those informed that investor 1 wanted the asset, but was
unable to purchase it, the rate increased to 71%; finally, among those informed that investor
1 wanted the asset, and was able to purchase it, the rate increased to 93%.19 There are
large, statistically significant peer effects; in addition, we find that each channel - social
utility and social learning - is individually economically and statistically significant. We
"We attempted to ensure that no information spread independently of the brokers' phone calls by requiring
that calls be made to both investors on the same day. Only 6 out of 150 investor 2's had communicated
with their associated investor l's about the asset prior to the phone call from the brokerage; dropping these
6 observations does not affect our results.
15 In Section 2.3.4, we discuss various other channels through which peer effects work that might be active
in this condition.
16 Investor 2 also had his decision to purchase confirmed or rejected by lottery, so he was made aware of
this randomization in all of the conditions. We have no reason to expect that investor 2 viewed investor l's
decision as anything other than a revealed preference.
1 7 1t is important to stress that we cannot identify why one's peer's possession of the asset matters, but
the finding that possession matters, regardless of the channel, is of interest.
'8It is difficult to quantitatively estimate the effect of possession above learning, as the purchase rate in
condition (3) is very close to 100%. Because the purchase rate is bounded above, we estimate what may
roughly be thought of as a lower bound of the effect of possession beyond learning.
19 The take-up rate in the control group is relatively high by design: the firm offered an appealing asset
that was not available outside of the experiment. We discuss the the asset in detail in Appendix 2.C.
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find that individuals learn from their peers., but also that there is an effect of possession
beyond learning. This is true not only for the purchase decision, but also for the decision
of whether to invest more than the minimum investment amount, and how much to invest
in the asset.
Our design allows us to examine another aspect of peer effects: the role played by selec-
tion into a socially-related pair in generating correlated choices among peers. In particular,
when investor 1 chose not to purchase the asset, his associated investor 2 was assigned to
a "negative selection" condition, in which no information was received about about the
peer. 20 We refer to these investor 2's as the "negative selection" condition, because the
information they receive is identical to that received by investor 2's in the control condition
(1); however, the investor 2's in the "negative selection" condition are those whose peers
specifically chose not to purchase the asset. Interestingly, we do not find large selection
effects: the take-up rate in the "negative selection group was 39%, not very different from
the take-up rate in condition (1).
If investors exhibit different levels of financial sophistication, a natural extension of
our analysis of social learning is to explore heterogeneity in that dimension. One would
expect that an investor with a high degree of financial sophistication is less likely to follow
the revealed preference decisions of other investors, because he will rely more on his own
assessment of the quality of an asset. On the other hand, an investor with a low degree
of financial sophistication will be more likely to be influenced by the revealed preference
decisions of other investors. Analogously, financially sophisticated investors may be more
likely than unsophisticated investors to influence their peers through the social learning
channel, given their greater knowledge of financial investments.
Using occupational categories to indicate financial sophistication2 1 ("sophisticated" in-
vestors have occupations in engineering, finance, accounting, etc.), we find that there is no
significant effect of social learning among sophisticated investor 2's, and a large, significant
social learning effect among unsophisticated investor 2's. The difference in the treatment
effects across these groups is statistically significant as well. We find weaker evidence sug-
gesting that investor 2's exhibit larger social learning effects when their associated investor 1
20 We did not reveal their peers' choices because the brokerage did not want to include experimental
conditions in which individuals learned that their peer did not want the asset.2 1Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), Calvet et al. (2009), and Abreu and Mendes (2010) find that investors'
occupations are correlated with measures of their financial sophistication.
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is sophisticated than when he is unsophisticated. These results suggest that learning about
the asset plays the predominant role in the social learning effects we observe, and that
competing stories do not seem to be driving our findings in the social learning condition.2 2
A final important concern with our design, common to many experimental studies,
regards the external validity of the findings. In the discussion of our empirical results, in
Section 2.3.4, we present evidence suggesting that our results do capture relevant effects,
albeit not representative of all peer effects in financial decisions. Importantly, we show:
(i) the set of investors in our study who chose to purchase the asset are similar to those
who do not want to make the purchase - this is important because our treatment effects of
interest condition on investor l's wanting to purchase the asset; (ii) the characteristics of our
sample of investors - selected because they shared a social connection with another client -
are roughly similar to those of the full set of clients of the main office of the brokerage with
which we worked; (iii) sales calls similar to those used in the study are common, accounting
for a large fraction of the brokerage's sales - this indicates the importance of communication
from brokers to clients in financial decision making.2 3
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2. we describe in detail our experimental
design, which attempts to separately identify the channels through which peer effects work;
in Section 3. we present our empirical specification and the results of our experiment, and
discuss our findings; finally, in Section 4, we offer concluding thoughts.
2.2 Experimental Design
The primary goal of our design was to decouple the decision to purchase the asset from pos-
session of the asset. To this end, we generated experimental conditions in which individuals
would make decisions: 1) uninformed about any choices made by their peer; 2) informed of
their peer's revealed preference to purchase an asset, but the (randomly determined) inabil-
ity of the peer to make the investment; and, 3) informed of their peer's revealed preference
to purchase an asset, and the peer's (randomly determined) successful investment. We now
describe the design in detail; in particular, the structuring of a financial asset that possessed
particular characteristics, and the implementation of multiple stages of randomization in
2 2We assess some alternative interpretations of our findings and some potential confounding factors in the
discussion of our empirical results in Section 2.3.4.
2 3While brokers generally do not provide information about specific clients' purchases, discussions with
the brokerage indicate that brokers do discuss the behavior of other investors in making their sales calls.
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the process of selling the asset.
2.2.1 Designing the Asset
The asset being offered needed to satisfy several requirements. Most fundamentally, there
needed to be a possibility of learning from one's peers' decisions; and, the asset needed to be
sufficiently desirable that some individuals would choose to purchase it, even in the absence
of peer effects. 24 To satisfy these requirements, the brokerage created a desirable, new,
risky asset specifically for this study. The asset is a combination of an actively-managed
mutual fund and a real estate note (the asset is described in detail in Appendix 2.C). The
brokerage piloted the sale of the asset (without using a lottery to determine possession), to
clients other than those in the current study, in order to ensure a purchase rate of around
50%.
Another requirement was that there be no secondary market for the asset, for several
reasons. First. we hoped to identify the impact of learning from peers' decisions to purchase
the asset, rather than learning from peers based on their experience possessing the asset.
Investor 2 may have chosen not to purchase the asset immediately, in order to talk with
investor 1. then purchase the asset from another investor. We wished to rule out this
possibility. In addition, we did not want peer pairs to jointly make decisions about selling
the asset. Finally, we did not want investor 2 to purchase the asset in hopes of selling it
to investor 1 when investor 1's investment choice was not implemented by the lottery. In
response to these concerns, the brokerage offered the asset only at the time of their initial
phone call to the client - there was a single opportunity to invest - and structured the asset
as having a fixed term with no resale - once the investment decision was made, the investor
would simply wait until the asset matured and then collect his returns.
A final requirement, given our desire to decouple the purchase decision from possession,
was that there must be limited entry into the fund to justify the lottery to implement
purchase decisions. The brokerage was willing to implement the lottery design required,
justified by the supply constraint for the asset they created for the study.25
2 4Many of our comparisons of interest are among those investor 2's whose associated investor l's chose to
purchase the asset, and investor 1 never receives any information about his peer (i.e., about investor 2).2 5There was a maximum allowable investment of R$10,000 per client on the real estate note component
of the investment; one investor invested the maximum amount.
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2.2.2 Selling the Asset
To implement the study, we designed (in consultation with the financial brokerage) a script
for sales calls that incorporated the randomization necessary for our experimental design
(the translated script is available in Appendix 2.D) .26 The sales calls made by brokers
possessed several important characteristics. First, and most importantly, the calls were
extremely natural: sales calls had frequently been made by the brokerage in the past;
investments resulting from brokers' calls are thus in no way unusual. 27 We believe that no
client suspected that the calls were being made as part of an experiment.2 8
Second, the experimental calls were made by the individual brokers who were accus-
tomed to working with the clients they called as part of the study; and, the calls only
deviated from brokers' typical sales calls as required to implement the experimental design.
Thus, clients would have trusted the broker's claims about their peer's choices, and would
have believed that the lottery would be implemented as promised. Third, because brokers
were compensated based on the assets they sold, they were simply incentivized to sell the
asset in each condition (rather than to confirm any particular hypothesis).29
Between January 26, and April 3, 2012, brokers called 150 pairs of clients whom the
brokerage had previously identified as having a social connection (48% are members of the
same family, and 52% are friends; see Table 2-1).30 It is important to note that, although
26We created the script using Qualtrics, a web-based platform that brokers would access and use to
structure their call; although brokers were not able to use the web-based script in all of their calls, two-
thirds of the calls used the Qualtrics script (it was occasionally abandoned when the website was not
accessible). The brokers were made very familiar with the script, however, and used Excel to generate the
randomization needed to execute the experimental design when unable to use Qualtrics. The treatment
effects are not significantly different if we restrict ourselves to the pairs whose calls followed the Qualtrics
script (results available upon request). The brokers entered the results of the randomization and the purchase
decisions in an Excel spreadsheet, which they then delivered to the authors.
2 7The brokerage communicated to us that approximately 70% of their sales were achieved through such
sales calls.
28Thus, our study falls into the category "natural field experiment", according to the classification in
Harrison and List (2004).
29 Thus, brokers would have used the available information in each experimental treatment as effectively
as possible. Any treatment effects measured can be thought of as the effects of information about a peer's
choice (or choice plus possession) when that information is "optimally" used by a salesperson. Of course, in
reality, information about peers' choices may be received from the peer (rather than from a salesperson), or
may not be observed at all; the magnitudes of our effects should be interpreted with this in mind.
3 0 In Table 2-1, we generally present means of the various investor characteristics. The exception is the
earnings variable, the median of which is shown to mitigate the influence of outliers: while the median
monthly income in our sample is R$4,500, one investor had monthly earnings of R$200,000. In addition to
the brokerage's record of a pair's social relationship, investor 2 was directly asked about the nature of his
relationship with investor 1, after investor 2 had decided whether to purchase the asset (investor 1 was not
asked about investor 2 at all). Finally, note that one of the authors (Bursztyn) was present for some of the
phone calls. In addition, for those and many of the other calls, we had a research assistant present. We
discuss the implications of broker monitoring in Section 2.3.4.
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the investors in this sample are not a random sample of the brokerage's clients, we find that
their observable characteristics are roughly similar to the full set of clients of the brokerage's
main office (see Table 2-1, columns 1 and 8).
Information on these clients' social relationships was available for reasons independent
of the experiment: the firm had made note of referrals made by clients in the past.3 ' In the
context of our experiment, this is particularly important because clients' social relationships
would not have been salient to those whose sales call did not include any mention of their
peer. If the second member of the peer pair had thought about his peer's potential offer and
purchase of the same asset, our measured effects would be attenuated. However, data from
the pilot calls made by the brokers prior to the experiment suggest that these potential peer
effects in the control condition are not of great importance: the brokerage called clients who
were not socially connected to other clients of the brokerage, and their purchase rate of the
asset was very similar to that of our control condition. We thus believe that without any
mention of the offer being made to the other member of the peer pair, there will be no peer
effect, though of course this may not be exactly true in reality.3 2
One member of the pair was randomly assigned to the role of "investor 1," while the
second member was assigned to the role of "investor 2."33 Investor 1 was called by the
brokerage and given the opportunity to invest in the asset without any mention of their
peer. The calls proceeded as follows. The asset was first described in detail to investor
1. After describing the investment strategy underlying the asset, the investor was told
that the asset was in limited supply; in order to be fair to the brokerage's clients, any
purchase decision would be confirmed or rejected by computerized lottery.34 If the investor
chose to purchase the asset, he was asked to specify a purchase amount. Then, a computer
would generate a random number from 1 to 100 (during the phone call), and if the number
was greater than 50, the investment would be authorized; the investor was informed of
3 1Some clients were known to have links to more than one other client. We only called a single investor 1
and a single investor 2 from these "networks" containing more than one individual to ensure that investors
did not learn about the asset outside of the brokers' sales calls.
3 2 We also asked the brokerage if any client mentioned their peer in the sales call, and the brokerage
indicated that this never occurred.
3 3 A comparison of the characteristics of investor l's and investor 2's can be seen in Appendix table 2.A. 1,
columns 1 and 2. The randomization resulted in a reasonable degree of balance across groups: 5 of 6 tests
of equality of mean characteristics across groups have p-values above 0.10. One characteristic, gender, is
significantly different across groups.
3 4 This is not as unusual as it may appear at first glance: for example, Instefjord et al. (2007) describe the
use of lotteries to allocate shares when IPO's are oversubscribed.
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the details of the lottery before making his purchase decision. 35 One might naturally be
concerned that knowledge of the lottery would affect the decision to invest. This would, of
course, be of greatest concern to us if any effect of the lottery interacted with treatment
status. It is reassuring to know, however, that in the brokerage's initial calls to calibrate
the asset's purchase rate, which did not mention the lottery, the purchase rate was 12 of
25, or 48% - very similar to what we observe among investors in our study receiving no
information about their peers.
Following the call to investor 1, the brokerage called the associated investor 2. The
brokers were told that, for each pair, both investors had to be contacted on the same
day to avoid any communication about the asset that might contaminate the experimental
design.36  If the broker did not succeed in reaching investor 2 on the same day as the
associated investor 1. the broker would not attempt to contact him again; this outcome
occurred for 12 investor l's, who are not included in our empirical analysis.3 7 When the
broker reached investor 2, he began the script just as he did for investor 1: describing the
asset, including the lottery to determine whether a purchase decision would be implemented.
Next, the broker implemented the experimental randomization and attempted to sell the
asset under the experimentally-prescribed conditions (described next). If investor 2 chose
to purchase the asset, a random number was generated to determine whether the purchase
decision would be implemented, just as was the case for investor 1.
2.2.3 Randomization into Experimental Conditions
The experimental conditions were determined as follows. Among the group of investor
l's who chose to purchase the asset, their associated investor 2's were randomly assigned
to receive information about investor l's choice and the lottery outcome, or to receive no
information. There was thus a "double randomization" - first, the lottery determining
3 5 Among investor 1's who wanted to purchase the asset, a comparison of the characteristics of investor l's
whose purchase decision was authorized and investor 1's whose purchase decision was not authorized can be
seen in Appendix table 2.A.1.The randomization resulted in a reasonable degree of balance across groups:
6 of 7 tests of equality of mean characteristics across groups have p-values above 0.10. One characteristic,
gender, is significantly different across groups.
3 6This restriction also limited the ability of investor pairs to coordinate their behavior (for example,
organizing side payments or transfers of the asset between friends). As noted above, 6 investor 2's had
communicated with their associated investor l's about the asset prior to the phone call from the brokerage,
but dropping these 6 observations does not affect our results.
3 7 Thus, to be clear, brokers called 162 investor 1's in order to attain our sample size of 150 pairs successfully
reached.
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whether investor 1 was able to make the investment, and second, the randomization deter-
mining whether investor 2 would be informed about investor l's investment choice and the
outcome of the first lottery.
This process assigns investor 2's whose associated investor 1's chose to purchase the asset
into one of three conditions (Figure 2-1 presents a graphical depiction of the randomization);
investor characteristics across the three experimental conditions can be seen in Table 2-2.
One-third were assigned to the "no information," control condition, condition (1). Half
of these come from the pool of investor 2's paired with investor l's who wanted the asset
but were not authorized to make the investment, and half from those paired with investor
l's who wanted to make the investment and were authorized to make it. Investor 2's in
condition (1) were offered the asset just as was investor 1, with no mention of an offer made
to their peer. 38
Two-thirds received information about their peer's decision to purchase the asset, as
well as the outcome of the lottery that determined whether the peer was allowed to invest
in the asset. 39 The randomization resulted in approximately one-third of investor 2's in
condition (2), in which they were told that their peer purchased the asset, but had that
choice rejected by the lottery. The final third of investor 2's were in condition (3), in which
they were told that their peer purchased the asset, and had that choice implemented by the
lottery.
The three conditions of investor 2's whose associated investor l's wanted to purchase
the asset are the focus of our analysis. Importantly, the investor 1's who chose to purchase
the asset were not an unusual subset of the clients in the study. When comparing investor
l's who chose to purchase the asset to those who chose not to purchase it, the means of
observables are very similar, as can be seen in Table 2-1, columns 3 and 4. This suggests
that the selection of investor l's who invest are not very different from the original pool of
clients who were reached. 40
Given the double randomization in our experimental design, investor 2's in conditions
38We can think of these investor 2's as "positively selected" relative to the set of investor l's, as the latter
were a random sample of investors, while the former are specifically those whose peer chose to purchase the
asset.
39Investor 2's were not informed of investor l's desired investment size, only whether investor 1 wished to
purchase the asset.
40 In addition, Table 2-1, columns 6 and 7, also suggests that investor 2's associated with investor l's who
chose to purchase the asset are similar to investor 2's associated with investor l's who chose not to purchase
the asset.
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(1), (2), and (3) should have similar observable characteristics, and would differ only in the
information they received. As a check of the randomization, we present in Table 2-2 the
individual investors' characteristics for each of the three groups, as well as tests of equality
of the characteristics across groups. As expected from the random assignment into each
group, the sample is well balanced across the baseline variables.
Along with the three conditions of interest, in some analyses we will consider those
investor 2's whose associated investor 1 chose not to invest in the asset (the characteristics
of these investor 2's can be seen in Table 2-1, column 7). We assign these investor 2's to
their own "negative selection" condition, in which they receive no information about their
peer. We did not reveal their peers' choices because the brokerage did not want to include
experimental conditions in which individuals learned that their peer did not want the asset.
These individuals were offered the asset in exactly the same manner as were investor l's
and investor 2's in condition (1). We refer to these investor 2's as those in the "negative
selection" condition, because the information they receive is identical to that received by
investor 2's in condition (1); however, the investor 2's in the "negative selection" condition
are those whose peers specifically chose not to purchase the asset.
2.2.4 Treatment Effects of Interest
Our experimental design allows us to make several interesting comparisons across groups of
investors. First, we can estimate overall peer effects, working through both social learning
and social utility channels. Consider the set of investor 2's whose peers had chosen to
purchase the asset (whether the investment was implemented or not). Among these investor
2's, a comparison of those in conditions (1) and (3) reveal the standard peer effect: in
condition (1), there is no peer effect active, as no mention was made of any offer being made
to the other member of the peer pair; in condition (3), the investor 2 is told that investor
1 successfully invested in the asset (so both social utility and social learning channels are
active).
Second, we can disentangle the channels through which peers' purchases affect invest-
ment decisions. Comparing investor 2's (again those whose peer chose to purchase the asset)
in conditions (1) and (2) will allow us to estimate the impact of social learning resulting
from a peer's decision but without possession. Comparing investor 2's purchase decisions
in conditions (2) and (3) will then allow us to estimate the impact of a peer's possession
61
alone, over and above learning from a peer's decision, on the decision to invest.41
In addition to identifying these peer effects, we will examine the role of "selection", by
comparing investor 2's in condition (1) to those in the "negative selection" condition; we will
also test for heterogeneous effects of social learning according to the financial sophistication
(proxied by occupation) of investor 2's and investor 1's.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
Before more formally estimating the effects of the experimental treatments, we present the
take-up rates in the raw data across categories of investor 2's (see Figure 2-2). Among
those investor 2's in the "no information" condition (1), the take up rate was around
42%; in the "social learning alone" condition (2), the take-up rate was around 70%; in the
"social learning plus social utility" condition (3), the take-up rate was just over 90%. These
differences represent economically and statistically significant peer effects: the difference of
around 50 percentage points in take-up rates between conditions (1) and (3) is large (and
statistically significant at 1%), indicating the relevance of peer effects in financial decisions;
moreover, we observe sizable and statistically significant effects of learning alone, and of
possession above learning as well.4 2 Interestingly, we do not see a big "selection" effect:
there was a 42% take-up rate in condition (1) and 39% in the "negative selection" group
(the difference is not statistically significant).
2.3.1 Regression Specification
To identify the effects of our experimental treatments, we will estimate regression models
of the following form:
Y =o+ E #1c~c,i + y'Xi + ei. (2.1)
C
41 It is important to emphasize that our estimated effect of possession is conditional on investor 2 having
learned about the asset from the revealed preference of investor 1 to purchase the asset. One might imagine
that the effect of possession of the asset by investor 1 without any revealed preference to purchase the asset
could be different. It is also important to point out that the estimated effect of "possession" is difficult
to interpret quantitatively: the measured effect is bounded above by 1 minus the take-up in Condition 2,
working against finding any statistically significant peer effects beyond social learning.
4 2The p-value from a test of equality between take-up rates in conditions (1) and (3) - the overall peer
effect - is 0.000. The p-value from a test that (2) equals (1) - social learning alone - is 0.040. The p-value
from a test that (3) equals (2) - possession's effect above social learning - is 0.047.
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Yi is an investment decision made by investor i: in much of our analysis it will be a
dummy variable indicating whether investor i wanted to purchase the asset, but we will
also consider the quantity invested, as well as an indicator that the investment amount was
greater than the minimum required. The variables Ic,i are indicators for investor i being in
category c, where c indicates the experimental condition to which investor i was assigned. In
all of our regressions, the omitted category of investors to which the others are compared will
be investor 2's in condition (1); that is, those investor 2's associated with a peer who wanted
to purchase the asset., but who received no information about their peer. In most of our anal-
yses, we will focus on investor 2's, so c E {condition (2), condition (3), "negative selection" }.
In some cases, we will also include investor l's in our analysis, and they will be assigned
their own category c. Finally, in some specifications we will include control variables: Xi is
a vector that includes broker fixed effects and investors' baseline characteristics.
2.3.2 Empirical Estimates of Social Utility and Social Learning
We first present the estimated treatment effects of interest using an indicator of the investor's
purchase decision as the outcome variable, and various specifications, in Table 2-3. We begin
by estimating a model using only investor 2's and not including any controls, in Table 2-3,
column 1. These results match the raw data presented in Figure 2-2: treatment effects are
estimated relative to the omitted category, investor 2's in condition (1), who had a take-up
rate of 42%. As can be seen in the table, the overall peer effect - the coefficient on the
indicator for condition (3) - is over 50 percentage points, and is highly significant.
In addition, social learning and social utility are individually significant. Investor 2's in
condition (2) purchased the asset at a rate nearly 29 percentage points higher than those
in condition (1), and the difference is significant. This indicates that learning without pos-
session affects the investment decision. The difference between the coefficient on condition
(3) and the coefficient on condition (2) indicates the importance of possession beyond social
learning. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 2-3, the 22 percentage point difference between
these conditions is statistically significant.43
Finally, the coefficient on the "negative selection" variable, in column 1 of Table 2-3,
4 3The possession effect could also capture a demand for joint insurance: closely-related peers might want
to diversify the risk in their investments. Joint insurance would imply a reduction of the measured effects
of possession above learning and thus attenuate our findings relating to that channel. Interestingly, we find
that friends choose assets similar to their peers', rather than trying to diversify their investments.
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gives us the difference in take-up rates between investor 2's whose peers did not want to
purchase the asset and investor 2's whose peers wanted to purchase the asset, with neither
group receiving information about their peers. As suggested by Figure 2-2, the estimated
selection effect is economically small, and it is not statistically significant.
We next present regression results including broker fixed effects (Table 2-3, column 2)
and including both broker fixed effects and baseline covariates (Table 2-3, column 3); then,
we estimate a regression including these controls and using the combined sample of investor
1's and investor 2's in order to have more precision (Table 2-3, column 4). The overall peer
effect, as well as the individual social learning and social utility channels, estimated using
these alternative regression models are very similar across specifications, providing evidence
that our randomization across conditions was successful.
We also consider two alternative outcome variables: the amount invested in the asset,
and a dummy variable indicating whether the investment amount was greater than the
minimum required. In Tables 2-4 and 2-5, we replicate the specifications presented in Table
2-3, but use the alternative outcome variables. As can be seen in Tables 2-4 and 2-5,
the results using these alternative outcomes closely parallel those using take-up rates. We
observe significant peer effects, significant social learning, and significant effects of possession
beyond learning. 44
The results across specifications in Table 2-3 through 2-5 indicate sizable peer effects in
financial decision making. Moreover, they suggest that both channels through which peer
effects work are important. Though our context is not perfectly general, the results lend
support both to models of peer effects emphasizing learning from others as well as to those
emphasizing keeping up with the Joneses and other "social utility" channels. We discuss in
more detail the external validity of the magnitudes of our coefficients in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.3 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
While we estimate sizable average treatment effects of social learning, as discussed above,
the importance of the social learning channel is likely to depend on investors' financial
sophistication. Financially sophisticated investors should put more weight on their own
signal of the quality of the asset relative to information derived from their peers' revealed
44The only difference worth noting is that we observe marginally significant differences between investor
l's and investor 2's in condition (1) using these two outcomes.
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preferences. Therefore, the learning channel should be less important for more financially
sophisticated investor 2's. Similarly, the information revealed by the action of one's peer
should be more influential if this peer is more financially sophisticated, and is thus likely
to have received a more precise signal of the asset's quality (see Appendix 2.B for a formal
treatment of this argument). Exploiting this source of heterogeneity is not only interesting
from a theoretical standpoint - since it is a natural extension of a social learning framework -
but it also helps rule out other alternative explanations driving our measured social learning
effects (as we discuss in Section 2.3.4).
Although we do not observe direct measures of financial sophistication for the investors
in our sample, we can use information on their occupations as a proxy.45 Investors who have
technical occupations (for example, professions related to engineering, finance, accounting,
etc.) are likely to be more financially sophisticated than those who do not (see the list
of occupations in our sample and their coding in Appendix table 2.A.2). Therefore, we
examine the heterogeneity in the social learning effect according to whether investor 2 or
investor 1 has a technical occupation.4 6
To identify the social learning effect for different groups of investors, we compare the
take-up rates of investor 2's with differing degrees of financial sophistication in conditions
(1) and (2).47 In Figure 2-3.1. we present raw take-up rates in conditions (1) and (2) for
investor 2's who have, and who do not have, technical occupations, respectively. One sees
no significant effect of social learning among investor 2's with technical occupations; on
the other hand, the impact of social learning is very large among those without technical
occupations. In Figure Figure 2-3.2, we present raw take-up rates in conditions (1) and
(2) for investor 2's whose associated investor 1's have, and who do not have, technical
occupations, respectively. One sees moderate social learning effects among both groups of
investor 2's. The effect appears larger for those learning from investor l's with technical
occupations, but the cell sizes are small, and confidence intervals are correspondingly large.
We present regression estimates in Table 2-6. Panel A presents comparisons of means for
4 5Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), Calvet et al. (2009), and Abreu and Mendes (2010) find that investors'
occupations are correlated with measures of their financial sophistication.
4 6 Since our experimental design allows us to quantify the importance of the social learning channel, but
it only allows us to test for a qualitative effect of possession over and above learning (because our estimates
of the latter are more likely to be affected by the upper bound of 100% take-up), we focus on the social
learning channel when contrasting the magnitude of peer effects for the different groups of investors.
'
7 We drop observations with "undetermined occupations", i.e., occupations that cannot be coded as
technical or non-technical, such as broad categories like "teacher" and "retired."
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investors who have, and who do not have, technical occupations (columns 1-2); and, whose
associated investor l's have, and do not have, technical occupations (columns 4-5). Panel
B, columns 1-2, reports effects estimated using the full specification of Table 2-3, column
4. but adding an interaction of the condition (2) dummy with a dummy indicating that the
investor has a technical occupation, and also an interaction of the condition (2) dummy
with with a dummy indicating that the investor does not have a technical occupation.
Panel B, columns 3-4, reports an analogous specification, but including an interaction of
the condition (2) dummy with a dummy indicating that the associated investor 1 has a
technical occupation, and also an interaction of a condition (2) dummy with a dummy
indicating that the associated investor 1 does not have a technical occupation. 48
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2-6, one sees that the social learning effect is large and
statistically significant when investor 2 does not have a technical occupation, while it is not
statistically significant when investor 2 has a technical occupation. While sophisticated and
unsophisticated investor 2's have similar take-up rates in the control condition (1), we can
reject at 5% or better that the social learning effect is the same for the two groups (see
Table 2-6, column 3).49 In Appendix tables 2.A.3 and 2.A.4, we show that social learning's
effects on investment amounts, and on an indicator that the investment amount was greater
than the minimum, are also significantly larger when investor 2 does not have a technical
occupation.
In Table 2-6, columns 4-6. one sees that social learning from investor l's with technical
occupations is not significantly greater than social learning from investor l's with non-
technical occupations. The point estimate of the effect of social learning is larger when
learning is from an investor 1 who had a technical occupation, but this difference should be
interpreted cautiously.50
48 Note that we do not combine into a single analysis the study of social learning by sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors with the study of social learning from sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.
One might expect that the greatest effect of social learning would occur when unsophisticated investors learn
from sophisticated ones; however, our sample size prevents us from running this sort of test. Finally, it is
important to note that sophisticated investors (both investor l's and 2's) are somewhat more likely to have
sophisticated peers, but this positive assortative matching is not statistically significant. Data are available
from the authors upon request.
49We also find that the social utility effect beyond learning is positive for investor 2's who have a technical
occupation, and zero for those who do not. However, this difference is most likely driven by the fact that the
take-up rate for the latter group is already close to one with only the learning channel active, leaving little
space for possession beyond learning to have a measurable effect. These results are available upon request.
50 In Appendix tables 2.A.3 and 2.A.4, we show that social learning's effects on investment amounts, and
on an indicator that the investment amount was greater than the minimum, are not clearly related to the
occupation of the associated investor 1.
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2.3.4 Discussion
Our results thus far present evidence strongly suggesting an important role played by social
learning alone and by possession above learning in driving individuals' financial decisions.
However, experiments in the field are typically imperfect, and ours is no exception. Thus, we
now discuss, in turn, alternative hypotheses (or confounding factors) that might contaminate
our experimental treatments; whether supply-side (broker) behavior played an important
role in generating the observed treatment effects; and, the external validity of our findings.
Alternative Hypotheses and Confounding Factors
One important concern in interpreting our results is that factors other than learning from
investor l's revealed preference are present in the social learning condition (condition (2)).
Investor 2's might have had different behavioral responses to their peer's loss of the lottery.
For instance, they might have felt guilt purchasing an asset that their peer wanted but
could not purchase; alternatively, they might have wanted the asset even more, to "get
ahead of the Joneses." These two behavioral responses would have opposite implications in
terms of changes in the magnitudes of the treatment effects observed in the social learning
condition. In evaluating this concern, we are reassured by our results (in Table 2-6) showing
heterogeneous effects of social learning depending on financial sophistication (proxied by
occupation). They suggest that the alternative stories do not drive our findings, unless
guilt or a desire to get "ahead of the Joneses" is systematically stronger among individuals
with more- or less-technical occupations.
Another potential concern within the social learning condition relates to side payments.
Since investor 1's wanted, but could not get, the asset, some investor 2's may have felt
tempted to make the investment and pass it along, or sell it, to their peer. Our design
reduces the impact of this type of concern for several reasons. First, investor l's who lost
the lottery did not know that investor 2's would receive the offer, so investor l's would likely
not have initiated this strategy following their sales call. Second, even had they suspected
that their friend would receive the offer, there was limited time between calls to investor
l's and investor 2's - indeed, only 6 out of 150 investor 2's reported that they heard about
the asset from their associated investor 1. Finally, once investor 2 received the offer, he was
unable to communicate with investor 1 prior to making his investment decision in order to
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facilitate coordination.
We can also address this concern to some extent with our experimental data. One might
expect side payments, if present and important, to be most prominent among peers who are
family members., as family members would have an easier time coordinating such payments
than would mere friends or coworkers. This would tend to drive up the estimated social
learning effect for pairs who are family members. In column 1 of Table 2-7, we consider
the full specification from column 4 of Table 2-3, but also including interactions of each
of our treatment (i.e., condition c) dummy variables with a dummy variable equal to one
if investor 1 and investor 2 are family members. The results suggest that the treatment
effects from social learning are not stronger among family members - the point estimate of
the interaction is almost exactly zero.
One might also think that knowing that a peer desired to purchase an asset (even if
he was unable to make the purchase) provides an indication of that peer's portfolio (or
future asset purchases outside of the study). As a result, the social learning condition could
potentially also contain some (anticipated or approximate) possession effect. This inference,
however, is a sophisticated one, and we would expect financially sophisticated clients to be
more likely to make it. However, as mentioned above, the effects of social learning are
actually very small for clients with technical occupations, arguing against this hypothesis.
There are also some concerns that could affect both the "learning alone" and the "learn-
ing plus possession" conditions. When individuals observe their peers desiring to purchase
an asset, they might update their priors about the existing demand for the asset and thus
about future asset prices. However, in our experiment, the asset is only sold during the
broker's call, and resale is not possible; thus, this concern does not seem to be relevant.
Another potential issue relates to trust in the information provided by the brokers during
the phone calls. However, we have no reason to think that clients would mistrust brokers
with whom they have had an ongoing relationship (especially regarding easily verifiable
claims).
Changes in Supply Side Behavior
Our study manipulates information received by agents on the demand side of a financial
market. Of course, there is a supply side in this market as well, and one could be concerned
that supply-side factors interact with our measured treatment effects. Brokers could exert
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differential effort toward selling the asset under different experimental conditions; they
could try to strategically sort subjects across conditions, overturning our randomization;
more generally, the experiment was not double blind, which might affect the implementation
of the design.
Fortunately, we believe that the impact of these various concerns was likely small, for
several reasons. First, as mentioned above, because brokers were compensated based on
the assets they sold, they were incentivized to sell the asset in all conditions (rather than
to confirm any particular hypothesis). Brokers would have used the available information
in each experimental treatment as effectively as possible.
As a more direct check of supply-side effects, we examine the impact of broker experience
on the treatment effects we estimate. Within the experiment, we view broker experience as
a measure of broker knowledge of our study, and hence, the "double-blindness" of a phone
call. We thus estimate the full specification of column 4 from Table 2-3, but including
an interaction of the treatment dummies with a measure of broker experience: for each
date of the study, we calculate the number of calls each broker had made before that date.
The estimates of these interactions, presented in column 2 of Table 2-7, show that broker
experience does not significantly affect the estimated treatment effects.
Brokers adjusting their effort across conditions or trying to overturn our randomization
would also likely be correlated with broker experience within the study: both of these would
be more profitably executed with some knowledge of investors' responses to the information
provided in different treatments. 51 The lack of sizable effects from the interactions of
broker experience with the treatment dummies suggests that these concerns do not drive
our findings.
Finally, our research assistant randomly visited the brokerage on 6 out of the 12 dates on
which sales calls were made, and monitored the brokers to check that they were following
the script. In column 3 of Table 2-7, we present the results of estimating estimate the
full specification of column 4 from Table 2-3, but including an interaction of the treatment
dummies with a dummy variable indicating whether the research assistant was present at the
brokerage. The results indicate that research assistant presence does not significantly affect
5
'For example, if brokers knew that investors were more likely to purchase the asset in the "learning and
possession" condition (3), they may have been willing to exert more costly effort to make a sale in that
condition. If certain types of investor 2's were more responsive to the information provided in a particular
experimental condition, brokers might have tried to shift them into the relevant condition.
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our treatment effects; this provides further evidence that the experiment was implemented
as designed, even when brokers were not closely monitored.
External Validity
A final important concern with our design regards the external validity of the findings.
There are several reasons to question the generality of the treatment effects we estimate.
First, our comparisons among investor 2's in conditions (1), (2), and (3) are conditional
on investor 1 wishing to purchase the asset. If this was an unusual sample of investor l's.
perhaps the associated investor 2's were unusual as well, and thus reveal peer effects that
cannot be viewed as representative even within our experimental sample.
In fact, when comparing investor l's who chose to purchase the asset to those who chose
not to purchase it, one sees that their observable characteristics are very similar (see Table
2-1, columns 3 and 4). The investor 2's associated with investor l's who chose to purchase
the asset are also similar to those associated with investor l's who chose not to purchase it
(see Table 2-1, columns 6 and 7).52 We also find that in the "no information" condition.
investor 2's associated with investor l's who chose to purchase the asset have a similar
purchase rate to investor 2's associated with investor 1's who chose not to purchase the
asset (Table 2-3). This suggests that conditioning on investor l's wanting to purchase the
asset does not produce an unusual subsample from which we estimate treatment effects.
A second question is how different our sample of investors is from other clients of the
brokerage - perhaps individuals who had referred (or had been referred by) other clients in
the past (and who were thus selected into our study) are a highly atypical sample. In Table
2-1, column 8, we present characteristics of the full set of the brokerage's clients from the
firm's main office. 5 3 Although the clients in our study's sample are not a random sample
of the brokerage's clients, we find that their observable characteristics are roughly similar
to the full set of clients of the main office.
One may question the representativeness of the form of communication studied in our
experiment. Certainly, peers often communicate among themselves, rather than being in-
formed about each other's activity by a broker trying to make a sale. While our study
5 2 This is a comparison of investor 2's in conditions (1), (2), and (3) to investor 2's in the "negative
selection" condition.5 3 The majority of the individuals in our experimental sample were selected from this office's clients, though
some were selected from other offices.
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focuses on only one type of communication generating peer effects, we believe it is impor-
tant: as noted above, approximately 70% of the brokerage's sales were derived from sales
calls, so information conveyed through such calls is extremely relevant to financial decisions
in this setting. Of course, in interpreting the magnitude of our effect, one might wish to
consider the likelihood of information transfer in the real world; our design estimates the im-
pact of information about one's peers conditional on receiving information - the endogenous
acquisition of information is not studied here.54
Finally, it is important to note that the type of social learning we focus on is that of
classic models, such as Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992): learning that occurs
upon observation of the revealed decision of purchase by a peer. Of course, there are other
types of social learning that might occur in finance, such as learning about the existence
of an asset, or learning occurring after the purchase (when to sell the asset, when to buy
more); these channels are shut down in our study because of the design of the financial
asset. However, these other forms of social learning are likely important as well.
2.4 Conclusion
Peer effects are an important, and often confounding, topic of study across the social sci-
ences. In addition, in many settings - particularly in finance - identifying why a person's
choices are affected by his peers' is extremely important, beyond identifying peer effects
overall. Our experimental design not only allows us to identify peer effects in investment
decisions, it also decouples revealed preference from possession, allowing us to provide ev-
idence that learning from one's peer's purchase decision and changing behavior due to a
peer's possession of an asset both affect investment decisions. Perhaps the most important
implication of these findings is support for models of social-learning based herding in finan-
cial markets, and also for herding based purely on a desire to own assets possessed by one's
peers.
Our findings should be extended in several directions. Most fundamentally, it is impor-
tant to determine their external validity. We are limited to studying a single asset; a single
mechanism through which peers' choices were communicated; and, pairs of socially-related
5 4 Duflo and Saez (2003)) present evidence that information about investment opportunities does flow
naturally to peers; our goal of disentangling separate channels of peers' influence required control over these
information flows.
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individuals. One might be interested in whether our findings extend to assets with different
expected returns or different exposures to risk; or, to investment decisions made from a
larger choice set. One might also wish to study whether information transmitted directly
among peers has a different effect from information transmitted through brokers. Of course,
the selection of information transmitted by brokers and by peers will be endogenous, and
studying the process determining which information gets transmitted, and to whom, would
be of great interest. Finally, studying information transmission through a broader network
of socially-related individuals is important as well.
To the extent that our results do shed light on financial decision making beyond our
experimental context, it is important to understand what they imply for asset pricing and
for policies that attempt to limit financial market instability. For example, herds based
on social learning could be mitigated if more, and better, information is made available
to investors. On the other hand, information provision will be less successful in limiting
correlated choices among peers if those correlated choices are driven by social utility. Our
findings suggest that information provision could reduce market instability, but only to a
certain point, because a significant component of the peer effects we find was generated by
social utility.55
In addition to the context of financial decision making, our experimental design could be
used in other settings to identify the channels through which peer effects work. In marketing,
various social media rely on different peer effect channels: Facebook "likes", Groupon sales,
and product give-aways all rely on some combination of the channels studied here. Future
work can compare the effectiveness of these strategies, and their impact through different
channels, using designs similar to ours. One could also apply our experimental design to
the study of technology adoption: one might wish to distinguish between the importance of
learning from a peer's purchase decision and the desire to adopt technologies used by people
nearby.5 6 Finally, health-promoting behavior often is affected both by learning from peers'
purchases and by peers' actual use of health care technology (e.g., vaccination or smoking
cessation).57 In these settings and others, separately identifying the roles of social learning
5 5Understanding why a peer's possession of an asset affects his decisions (beyond learning) is an important
next step in clarifying the implications of our findings here.
5 6Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Conley and Udry (2010) identify the important role played by social
learning in technology adoption. Social utility might exist in this setting because using a technology might
be easier or less expensive when others nearby use it (network externalities); because one wishes not to fall
behind those living nearby; etc.
5 7 One can also learn about health care products from a peer's experience of the product - a type of
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and social utility might be of interest to policymakers.
learning we do not consider in this study. Kremer and Miguel (2007) study the transmission of knowledge
about de-worming medication through social networks.
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2.A Figures and Tables
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Figure 2-1: Experimental design "roadmap"
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Figure 2-2: Investor 2's take-up rates
I
Group
Condition (3) Negative selection
Note: This figure presents the mean (and 95% confidence intervals) of take-up rates for each group of investor 2's.
Investors in conditions (1) to (3) have peers who wanted the asset. These investors were randomly allocated to one of
these 3 groups. Those in condition (1) had no information about their peers. Those in condition (2) had information
that their peers wanted to purchase the asset but had that choice rejected by the lottery. Those in condition (3) had
information that their peers wanted and received the asset. Investors in the negative selection group have peers who










ConditIon (1) Condition (2)
Figure 2-3: Heterogeneity of Social Learning Effects








investor 1 has a technical occupation
Group
Note: Panel A presents figures with the mean (and 95% confidence intervals) of take-up rates for investor 2's in
conditions (1) and (2), separately for those who have and who do not have a technical occupation. Panel B presents
these figures separately for those whose associated investor 1's have and who do not have a technical occupation.
Investors in conditions (1) and (2) have peers who wanted the asset. Those in condition (1) had no information about
their peers. Those in condition (2) had information that their peers wanted to purchase the asset but had that choice
rejected by the lottery.
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Table 2-1: Characteristics of the Experimental Sample
Experimental Sample
Investor 1 Investor 2 Universe
Full All Wanted the asset? All Peer wanted the asset?
Sample Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 38.15 39.12 39.60 38.60 37.18 36.45 37.97 34.14
(0.80) (1.14) (1.60) (1.62) (1.12) (1.50) (1.68) (0.16)
Gender 0.680 0.747 0.769 0.722 0.613 0.641 0.583 0.729
(=1 If male) (0.027) (0.036) (0.048) (0.053) (0.040) (0.055) (0.059) (0.006)
Married 0.413 0.440 0.436 0.444 0.387 0.333 0.444 0.340
(0.028) (0.041) (0.057) (0.059) (0.040) (0.054) (0.059) (0.006)
Single 0.557 0.527 0.513 0.542 0.587 0.628 0.542 0.647
(0.029) (0.041) (0.057) (0.059) (0.040) (0.055) (0.059) (0.006)
Earnings 4,500 5,000 5,000 5,000 4,000 4,000 3,500 3,200
(256) (499) (501) (775) (507) (504) (650) (126)
Technical 0.62 0.64 0.69 0.58 0.59 0.55 0.64 0.59
Occupation (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01)
Relationship 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.43
with associated (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
investor
(=1 if family)
N 300 150 78 72 150 78 72 5506
Notes: Column 1 presents the characteristics of the experimental sample, combining investor l's and investor
2's. Column 2 presents the
and 4 present the informati
sample characteristics of investor l's in the experimental sample, while columns 3
on for investor l's who wanted and who did not want the asset, respectively. Column
5 presents the characteristics of investors 2's in the experimental sample, while columns 6 and 7 present the
information for investor 2's whose peers wanted and did not want the asset, respectively. Column 8 presents the
characteristics of the universe of investors in the main office of the brokerage. Each line presents averages of the
corresponding variable. For earnings, we present the median value instead of the mean due to large outliers. The
sample size for the earnings variable is smaller due to missing values. The sample size for the technical occupation
dummy is smaller because we considered as missing values professions that are indeterminate. The omitted value
for "Relationship with associated investor" is "friends". This variable is not defined for investors outside the
experiment's sample.
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Table 2-2: Covariates balance
Investor 2 conditional on investor 1 wanted to purchase the asset
Control Learning Learning p-value of test: N
only + possession (1)=(2)=(3) (1)=(2) (1)=(3) (2)=(3)
N=26 N=24 N=28
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 37.92 34.50 36.75 0.59 0.31 0.75 0.57 78
(2.16) (2.55) (2.98)
Gender (=1 If male) 0.654 0.667 0.607 0.90 0.93 0.73 0.66 78
(0.095) (0.098) (0.094)
Married 0.385 0.250 0.357 0.56 0.31 0.84 0.41 78
(0.097) (0.090) (0.092)
Single 0.538 0.708 0.643 0.47 0.22 0.44 0.62 78
(0.100) (0.095) (0.092)
Earnings 4,000 4,000 4,500 0.81 0.79 0.68 0.52 67
(782) (534) (1,941)
Technical Occupation 0.67 0.40 0.53 0.29 0.12 0.44 0.48 51
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Relationship with 0.46 0.67 0.46 0.24 0.15 0.98 0.14 78
investor 1 (=1 if family) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Joint test 0.15 0.26 0.86 0.29
Notes: The sample is conditioned on investor 2's whose associated investor 1's wanted to purchase the asset. Each line
-KI
presents averages of the corresponding variable for each treatment group. Robust standard errors in
each variable, the p-value of an F-test that the mean of the corresponding variable is the same for all
parentheses. For
treatment groups
is presented in column 4. The p-value of a joint test of equality for all variables is also presented. The p-values of F-tests
on pairwise treatment group comparisons are presented in columns 5 to 7. For earnings, we present the median and the
p-value of a test that the median of this variable is the same for all treatment groups. The sample size for the earnings
variable is smaller due to missing values. The sample size for the technical occupation dummy is smaller because we
considered as missing values professions that are indeterminate.
Table 2-3: Peer Effects, Social Learning, Social Utility, and Selection: Take-up
Rates
Dependent variable Wanted to purchase the asset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Learning alone 0.285** 0.298** 0.328** 0.278**
(Condition (2) - Condition (1)) (0.136) (0.140) (0.134) (0.127)
Learning and possession 0.505*** 0.540*** 0.552*** 0.500***
(Condition (3) - Condition (1)) (0.110) (0.122) (0.123) (0.111)
Negative selection 
-0.034 0.011 -0.005 0.042
(0.114) (0.124) (0.118) (0.117)
Investor 1 0.128
(0.106)
Possession alone 0.220** 0.242** 0.224* 0.222**
(Condition (3) - Condition (2)) (0.106) (0.109) (0.124) (0.108)
Mean (no information; peer chose the asset) 0.423
(Condition (1)) (0.099)
Broker fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes
N 150 150 150 300
R2 0.186 0.228 0.283 0.219
Notes: Column 1 presents the results of a regression of a dummy variable equal to one
if the investor wanted to purchase the asset on a dummy for condition (3), a dummy for
condition (2), and a dummy indicating whether the associated investor 1 did not want to
purchase the asset ("Negative selection"). Investor 2's in condition (1) is the omitted group.
This regression uses only the sample of investor 2's. The regression presented in column 2
includes broker fixed effects. The regression presented in column 3 includes the covariates
presented in Table 2-2. We did not include earnings or the technical occupation dummy
as this would reduce our sample size (results including these variables are similar). The
regression presented in column 4 combines the sample of investors 1 and 2, and includes
an indicator variable for investor 1. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. In all
columns, "Possession alone" gives the difference between the coefficient on "Learning and
possession" and the coefficient on "Learning alone." * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2-4: Peer Effects, Social Learning, Social Utility, and Selection: Amount
Invested
Dependent variable Amount invested
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Learning alone 948.7*** 861.3** 825.3* 715.2*
(Condition (2) - Condition (1)) (357.7) (379.5) (421.2) (394.5)
Learning and possession 2,633.2*** 2,556.5*** 2,564.8*** 2,521.4***
(Condition (3) - Condition (1)) (702.9) (633.0) (613.4) (611.9)
Negative selection -106.8 -3.0 -6.4 123.9
(239.0) (272.7) (305.3) (308.6)
Investor 1 503.8*
(300.1)
Possession alone 1,684.5** 1,695.1** 1,739.6** 1,806.1**
(Condition (3) - Condition (2)) (731.4) (721.2) (743.4) (727.0)
Mean (no information; peer chose the asset) 884.6
(Condition (1)) (210.0)
Broker fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes
N 150 150 150 300
R 2  0.251 0.277 0.316 0.264
Notes: Column 1 presents the results of a regression of the amount invested in the asset on a dummy
for condition (3), a dummy for condition (2), and a dummy indicating whether the associated
investor 1 did not want to purchase the asset ("Negative selection"). Investor 2's in condition
(1) is the omitted group. This regression uses only the sample of investor 2's. The regression
presented in column 2 includes broker fixed effects. The regression presented in column 3 includes
the covariates presented in Table 2-2. We did not include earnings or the technical occupation
dummy as this would reduce our sample size (results including these variables are similar). The
regression presented in column 4 combines the sample of investors 1 and 2, and includes an indicator
variable for investor 1. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. In all columns, "Possession
alone" gives the difference between the coefficient on "Learning and possession" and the coefficient
on "Learning alone." * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2-5: Peer Effects, Social Learning, Social Utility, and Selection: Invested
More than Minimum
Dependent variable Invested more than minimum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Learning alone 0.212** 0.203** 0.186* 0.173*
(Condition (2) - Condition (1)) (0.097) (0.093) (0.098) (0.095)
Learning and possession 0.497*** 0.475*** 0.481*** 0.485***
(Condition (3) - Condition (1)) (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.101)
Negative selection -0.038 -0.029 -0.033 -0.016
(0.038) (0.042) (0.046) (0.049)
Investor 1 0.097*
(0.053)
Possession alone 0.286** 0.271** 0.295** 0.311**
(Condition (3) - Condition (2)) (0.131) (0.130) (0.132) (0.128)
Mean (no information; peer chose the asset) 0.038
(Condition (1)) (0.038)
Broker fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes
N 150 150 150 300
R2 0.338 0.366 0.402 0.295
Notes: Column 1 presents the results of a regression of a dummy variable equal to one if the
investor invested more than the minimum amount on a dummy for condition (3), a dummy
for condition (2), and a dummy indicating whether the associated investor 1 did not want
to purchase the asset ("Negative selection"). Investor 2's in condition (1) is the omitted
group. This regression uses only the sample of investor 2's. The regression presented in
column 2 includes broker fixed effects. The regression presented in column 3 includes the
covariates presented in Table 2-2. We did not include earnings or the technical occupation
dummy as this would reduce our sample size (results including these variables are similar).
The regression presented in column 4 combines the sample of investors 1 and 2, and includes
an indicator variable for investor 1. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. In all
columns, "Possession alone" gives the difference between the coefficient on "Learning and
possession" and the coefficient on "Learning alone." * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2-6: Heterogeneity of Social Learning Effects
Investor 2 Associated investor 1
has a technical occupation has a technical occupation
p-value of p-value of
Yes No test (1)=(2) Yes No test (4)=(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: no controls
Learning alone -0.167 0.571*** 0.027 0.250 0.125 0.749
(Condition (2) - Condition (1)) (0.249) (0.198) (0.215) (0.323)
Panel B: full specification
Learning alone -0.153 0.543*** 0.003 0.208 0.077 0.659
(Condition (2) - Condition (1)) (0.227) (0.139) (0.177) (0.286)
Mean (no information; peer chose the asset) 0.500 0.429 0.771 0.500 0.375 0.620
(Condition (1)) (0.140) (0.197) (0.168) (0.182)
Notes: Panel A reports comparisons of means for each group; panel B reports coefficients using the full specification of
column 4 from Table 2-3 with the condition 2 dummy interacted with a dummy indicating that the relevant investor
(either 1 or 2) has a technical occupation, and also interacted with a dummy indicating that the relevant investor does
not have a technical occupation. We also include a technical occupation dummy. Columns 1 and 2 present the learning
effects (investor 2's in condition (2)) and the take-up rates for investor 2's in the control group (condition (1)) for
investor 2's who have a technical occupation and for investor 2's who do not have a technical occupation. respectively.
Column 3 reports the p-value of a test that the learning effect and the baseline take-up rates are the same for these
two groups. Investor 2's for whom it is not possible to determine whether they have a technical occupation or not are
excluded from this analysis. Columns 4 to 6 are analogous, but examine heterogeneity associated with investor 2' s
peer's (i.e., investor l's) having a technical occupation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%.
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Table 2-7: Robustness Tests
Interaction of the Relationship with Broker experience RA was present
treatment effects with: investor 1 (=1 if family) within the experiment during the call
(1) (2) (3)
Learning alone 0.077 -0.001 0.140
(0.305) (0.008) (0.268)
Learning and possession 0.417* -0.003 0.248
(0.232) (0.008) (0.234)
Possession alone 0.340 -0.001 0.108
(0.220) (0.007) (0.203)
Notes: This table presents coefficients on the interactions of the variables at the column heading
with the treatment effects of interest. These results are based on the regressions used in the
full specification of column 4 from Table 2-3, including interactions of the group dummies (I,,
where c E {condition (2), condition (3), "negative selection", investor 1}) with the corresponding
variables. We also include the main effect of the corresponding variable. In column 1, we interact
the treatment effects with a dummy variable equal to one if the investors 1 and 2 are family
members. The omitted category is "friends". In column 2, we interact the treatment effects
with a variable indicating the number of calls that the broker made before the day of the call.
In column 3, we interact the treatment effects with a variable indicating whether our research
assistant was present during the call. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%.
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Table 2.A.1: Covariates Balance - Other Randomizations
Assignment to investor 1 or investor 2 Lottery for investor l's who wanted the asset
p-value of p-value of
Investor 1 Investor 2 test N Won Lost test N
(1)=(2) (5) =(6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 39.12 37.18 0.22 300 39.47 39.71 0.94 78
(1.14) (1.12) (2.34) (2.23)
Gender (=1 If male) 0.747 0.613 0.01 300 0.861 0.690 0.07 78
(0.036) (0.040) (0.058) (0.072)
Married 0.440 0.387 0.35 300 0.472 0.405 0.56 78
(0.041) (0.040) (0.084) (0.077)
Single 0.527 0.587 0.30 300 0.528 0.500 0.81 78
(0.041) (0.040) (0.084) (0.078)
Earnings 5,000 4,000 0.22 270 5,000 5,000 0.59 74
(499) (507) (925) (754)
Technically skilled 0.64 0.59 0.47 195 0.73 0.66 0.55 55
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
Relationship with - - - - 0.44 0.60 0.19 78
peer (=1 if family) (0.08) (0.08)
Joint test 0.15 0.23
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 present the averages of the corresponding variable, respectively, for investors assigned to be
in the role of investor 1 and for those assigned to be in the role of investor 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Relationship with peer is not considered in this comparison since this variable is equal for both groups by construction.
Column 3 presents the p-value of an F-test that the mean of the corresponding variable is the same for these two groups.
The p-value of a joint test of equality for all variables is also presented. Column 5 presents the averages for investor l's
who wanted the asset and won the lottery, while column 6 presents the averages for investor l's who wanted the asset
but did not win the lottery. Column 7 presents the p-value of an F-test that the mean of the corresponding variable is
the same for these two groups. For earnings, we present the median and the p-value of a test that the median of this
variable is the same for the corresponding groups. The sample size for the earnings variable is smaller due to missing
values. The sample size for the technical occupation dummy is smaller as we considered as missing value professions that
are indeterminate.
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Bank employee or clerk
Accountant
Real estate, insurance or securities broker
Economist
Systems analyst









Retail or wholesale salesperson
Administrative agent
Physical therapist or occupational therapist
Aircraft pilot
Advertising agent





Professional athlete or sports coach






















Electricity, electronics or telecommunications technician
















































































































Table 2.A.3: Heterogeneity of Social Learning Effects - Amount Invested
Investor 2 Associated investor 1
has a technical occupation has a technical occupation
p-value of p-value of
Yes No test (1)=(2) Yes No test (4)=(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: no controls
Learning alone -404.8 1,920.6*** 0.004 650.0 750.0 0.927
(Condition (2) - Condition (1)) (513.6) (538.7) (523.5) (955.0)
Panel B: full specification
Learning alone -807.4 1.797.9*** 0.004 929.7 -635.2 0.326
(Condition (2) - Condition (1)) (764.1) (480.3) (660.7) (1,314.4)
Mean (no information; peer chose the asset) 1.071.4 857.1 0.673 1,100.0 750.0 0.515
(Condition (1)) (309.0) (393.3) (381.0) (363.1)
Notes: Panel A reports comparisons of means for each group; panel B reports coefficients using the full specification of
column 4 from Table 2-3 with the condition 2 dummy interacted with a dummy indicating that the relevant investor (either
1 or 2) has a technical occupation, and also interacted with a dummy indicating that the relevant investor does not have
a technical occupation. We also include a technical occupation dummy. Columns 1 and 2 present the learning effects
(investor 2's in condition (2)) and the take-up rates for investor 2's in the control group (condition (1)) for investor 2's who
have a technical occupation and for investor 2's who do not have a technical occupation, respectively. Column 3 reports
the p-value of a test that the learning effect and the baseline take-up rates are the same for these two groups. Investor 2's
for whom it is not possible to determine whether they have a technical occupation or not are excluded from this analysis.
Columns 4 to 6 are analogous, but examine heterogeneity associated with investor 2' s peer's (i.e.. investor l's) having a
technical occupation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.A.4: Heterogeneity of Social Learning Effects - Invested More than Minimum
Investor 2 Associated investor 1
has a technical occupation has a technical occupation
p-value of p-value of
Yes No test (1)=(2) Yes No test (4)=(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: no controls
Learning alone -0.071 0.444** 0.011 0.067 0.250 0.512
(Condition (2) - Condition (1)) (0.073) (0.176) (0.153) (0.230)
Panel B: full specification
Learning alone 
-0.042 0.371** 0.022 0.040 0.097 0.842
(Condition (2) - Condition (1)) (0.088) (0.158) (0.139) (0.258)
Mean (no information; peer chose the asset) 0.071 0.000 0.336 0.100 0.000 0.335
(Condition (1)) (0.072) (0.000) (0.101) (0.000)
Notes: Panel A reports comparisons of means for each group; panel B reports coefficients using the full specification of
column 4 from Table 2-3 with the condition 2 dummy interacted with a dummy indicating that the relevant investor
(either 1 or 2) has a technical occupation, and also interacted with a dummy indicating that the relevant investor
does not have a technical occupation. We also include a technical occupation dummy. Columns 1 and 2 present the
learning effects (investor 2's in condition (2)) and the take-up rates for investor 2's in the control group (condition
(1)) for investor 2's who have a technical occupation and for investor 2's who do not have a technical occupation,
respectively. Column 3 reports the p-value of a test that the learning effect and the baseline take-up rates are the same
for these two groups. Investor 2's for whom it is not possible to determine whether they have a technical occupation
or not are excluded from this analysis. Columns 4 to 6 are analogous, but examine heterogeneity associated with
investor 2' s peer's (i.e., investor l's) having a technical occupation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *
significant at 1%.
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2.B Appendix: A Simple Model of Financial Decisions Un-
der Social Influence
Our model studies an investment decision made by an individual under several conditions.
First. we present the investment decision under uncertainty, but with no social influence.
Second, we present the investment decision with social learning present., using the ingredi-
ents of a canonical social learning model: a peer makes an investment acting on a private
signal, and this action can be used by another investor to make an informational inference
before taking his own action. Third, we allow the ownership of an asset to affect a socially-
related investor's utility of owning the asset, aside from any learning - that is., we allow for
a social utility effect. A peer's purchase decision typically will produce both social learning
and social utility effects; we consider a case in which both effects are active (the full "peer
effect") and a case in which the revealed preference purchase decision is de-coupled from
possession. This de-coupling allows one to observe each channel through which peer effects
work, and motivates our experimental design.
Investment without Peer Effects
Consider an investor i's decision to invest in a risky asset.5 8 The asset's return is given by
x, with probability density function f(x), and investor i's utility is ui(x) = u(x) for all i.
In our field experiment, investors received calls from brokers who offered them a financial
asset for purchase. The brokers attempted to convey the same information about the asset
in every call using a pre-specified script; thus, the information they provided can be thought
of as a signal., si, coming from a single distribution, with probability density function g(si).
Importantly, not every investor would have received exactly the same information: calls
evolve in different ways, investors ask different questions about the asset, etc., meaning
that each investor received a different signal realization, si, from the common distribution
of signals.
For expositional simplicity, assume that the conditional density f(xIsi) satisfies the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) such that, intuitively, higher values of si are
indicative of higher values of x. Under these conditions, investor i is willing to invest if and
5 8 Note that we implicitly assume that when investing in isolation, investor i does not take into consider-
ation any investor j (j # i) at all - he is "unaware." In the context of our experiment, we believe that this
assumption is reasonable, as we discuss in the text.
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only if
u(x)f (zsi)dx> ii, (2.2)
where ii denotes the outside option of the investor. Given that f(xIsi) satisfies MLRP and
given mild monotonicity assumptions on the utility function u(-) of the investor, there exists
a unique threshold si such that for any si > §i investor i is willing to invest. Denote the
decision to buy the asset made by investor i by bi = {0, 1}. Hence, for an investor making
a purchase decision in isolation, we have
bi = 1 4 si > §i. (2.3)
Investment with Social Learning Alone
Suppose that instead of making his investment choice in isolation, before making his own
decision, investor i observes the investment decision of investor j which is given by bj.
Assume that investor j made his choice by = 1 in isolation and hence his decision rule is
given by (2.3).59 Thus, when investor i observes bj = 1 he correctly infers that sj 2 si and
he is willing to invest if and only if
u(x)f(xlsi; sj > §I)dx > f. (2.4)
Furthermore, given that f(xIsi; sj) satisfies MLRP we have
J u(x)f(xlsi; sj > 9i)dx 2 J u(x)f(xsj)dx, (2.5)
for all si. It is straightforward to show by comparing (2.4) and (2.2) that the signal realiza-
tion threshold for investor i that is necessary to induce purchase of the asset is lower when
bj= 1 is observed than when investor i makes his choice in isolation. This is because in
the former case, regardless of his own private information summarized by si, investor i has
additional favorable information about the asset from observing the purchase of investor j.
This is the pure social learning effect.
Denote the threshold for si when investor i observes by = 1 by §2 and note that §2 < §1-
59 We focus on the case of investor i observing that investor j chose to purchase the asset (rather than
choosing not to purchase it) because in the experimental design, we were not allowed to inform investors
that their peer chose not to purchase the asset.
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In particular, after observing a purchase decision made by investor j, the decision rule of
investor i is given by
b=1 = s i > 82 (2.6)
Social Utility and Social Learning
We now consider the situation in which both social utility and social learning effects are
present. Our focus (following much of the literature on peer effects in financial decisions)
is on social utility effects that result in a positive effect of a peer's possession of an asset
(denoted by p = {0, 1}) on one's own utility.6 0 In particular, when investor i considers
purchasing the asset, we assume that u(xlpj = 1) > u(xlpj = 0) for all x. That is, investor
i's utility is higher for all asset return realizations if the asset is also possessed by an investor
j who is a peer of investor i. Using the notation of our model, an investor j's purchase of
an asset, by = 1, typically implies both that investor i infers favorable information about
the asset, si > si. and that investor j now possesses the asset, p3 = 1, which might affect
investor i's utility of owning the asset (due to a taste for joint consumption, "keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses" preferences).
When investor i observes that investor j expressed an intention to invest, b3 = 1, and
was allowed to invest. p3 = 1, both investor i's utility u(xlpj = 1) and his information about
the asset f(xIsi; sj > si) are affected. relative to his choice in isolation (that is, relative to
u(x) = u(xlpj = 0) and f(xsi)).61 In this case, one observes the "full" peer effect, and
investor i invests if and only if
Ju(xpj = 1)f(xlsi; sj > si)dx > u. (2.7)
Denote the threshold for si above which investor i is willing to invest when exposed to both
peer effects channels by §3. Then, the decision rule for investor i is given by
b=1 = si >- 3. (2.8)
To separate the effects of social learning and social utility, we need to decouple will-
60One could also imagine a negative correlation, for example, out of a desire to insure one's peers, or to
differentiate oneself. See Clark and Oswald (1998).
61We are assuming here that the utility function discussed above, u(x), is the same as u(xjpj = 0) here.
In addition, we are assuming that investor j made his decision in isolation.
91
ingness to purchase (and the informative signal of the purchase decision) from possession.
Consider the situation where investor i observes that investor j expressed a revealed prefer-
ence to invest, but was not allowed to do so (perhaps due to capacity constraints). In this
case, investor i infers that sy > si, but also knows that investor j did not obtain the asset,
so p3 = 0. This condition is equivalent to the "social learning alone" problem discussed
above: there is no direct effect of possession on investor i's utility from the asset, but there
is social learning. Thus, investor i purchases the asset if and only if (2.4) is satisfied (since
u(x) = u(xpj = 0)) and this leads to the same decision rule as (2.6) with the threshold §2.
The following proposition summarizes investor i's purchase decisions across conditions.
Proposition 1. The threshold for the signal si above which investor i is willing to purchase
the asset (and, the likelihood of a purchase of the asset by investor i) is highest (lowest)
when the investor makes his decision in isolation, lower (higher) when he observes that
investor j intended to purchase the asset but did not obtain it, and lowest (highest) when
investor j intended to purchase the asset, and obtained it: §1 s2 53 (and Pr(s 2  53)
Pr(si 52) > Pr(si2 > 1)).
Proof. The relationship between §i and 92 follows immediately from comparing the inequal-
ities (2.2) and (2.4) and the monotone likelihood ratio property of f(xzsi; sj). Similarly,
comparison of the inequalities (2.4) and (2.7) and u(x) = u(xzpy = 0) <; u(xpj = 1) es-
tablishes that §2 2 §3. Finally, Pr(si > s 3 ) 2 Pr(si > §2) Pr(si 2 51) follows from the
ranking of the thresholds. El
The difference between s2 and s-3 is the result of a difference in investor j's possession
of the asset.6 2 In one situation investor j received favorable information and expressed
an intent to purchase the asset, but was unable to execute the purchase due to supply
restrictions. In the other situation investor j received a favorable signal and was also able
to obtain the asset. Thus, in the two cases investor i infers the same information (via
investor j's choice) about the potential returns of asset x. However, only in the latter
case is investor i's utility directly influenced by the investment outcome (and not just the
purchase intention) of investor j. This is the social utility effect that raises the expected
6 Note that the difference between S2 and S3 measures the impact of possession conditional on the presence
of social learning. This is consistent with our experimental design, in which we are not able to measure the
impact of possession in the absence of social learning.
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utility of purchasing the asset for investor i over and above the social learning effect. In
the inequalities in Proposition 1, the effect of social learning is captured by the difference
between Pr(si 92) and Pr(si 2 s1), and the effect of social utility is the difference between
Pr(si > 93) and Pr(si > §2). The total peer effect is the difference between Pr(si 2 93) and
Pr(si 2 §i).
Our analysis readily extends to the case in which investor i's investment choice is con-
tinuous rather than limited to a binary decision. In particular, since f(xIsi; sj) satisfies
MLRP, the optimal investment in the asset is increasing in si and sj and the expected equi-
librium investment amounts will follow exactly the prediction regarding purchase rates in
Proposition 1. Suppose individual i chooses an investment magnitude q*, rather than mak-
ing a binary investment decision. Since f(xsi; sj) satisfies MLRP, the optimal investment
in the asset is increasing in si and sj and we can rank the expected equilibrium investment
amounts.
Proposition 2. The expected equilibrium investment amount q* of investor i is lowest
when the investor makes his decision in isolation, higher when he observes that investor j
intended to purchase the asset but did not obtain it, and highest when investor j intended
to purchase, and obtained, the asset.
Proof. The inference problem of investor i is the same as in Proposition 1. Thus, for a given
signal si the described relationship holds for the actual equilibrium investment amount and
follows immediately from comparing the expression for the utilities on the left-hand side of
the inequalities (2.2). (2.4) and (2.7) and by noting that the optimal investment amount
is increasing in si and sj. Finally, taking expectations over the signal realizations si yields
the ranking in expected investment amounts.
Heterogeneous Investors
In practice, some investors are more financially sophisticated than others, and one would
expect that this variation will affect the peer effects we study here - especially the impact
of social learning. In particular, an unsophisticated investor may have much more to learn
about an asset from the purchase decision of their peer than does a sophisticated investor, as
the sophisticated investor likely has a very good sense of the asset's quality from his signal
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alone. Differing financial sophistication can be captured in our model by allowing the
signals si and sj to be drawn from distributions with differing precision. For simplicity, we
make the assumption that, in contrast to unsophisticated investors, sophisticated investors
receive perfectly informative signals. This assumption generates the following prediction of
heterogeneous effects of social learning.
Proposition 3. The thresholds 91 and 92 for the signal si above which investor i is willing to
purchase the asset (and hence the likelihood of investor i purchasing the asset) are identical
if investor i is financially sophisticated (i.e., signal si is perfectly informative). If investor j
is sophisticated, then investor i follows the choice of investor j when observing the decision
of investor j.
Proof. If si is perfectly informative (i.e., investor i is sophisticated), then si is a sufficient
statistic for x. As a result, sj, and hence the purchase decision of investor j, has no
informational value for sophisticated investor i and does not influence the threshold 91.
Hence, i = 52. If sj is perfectly informative, then investor j knows the value of x and
makes a perfectly informed investment decision. As a result, investor i follows investor j's
choice. E
Proposition 3 suggests that social learning will be limited (in fact, given the simplifying
assumptions made., will be nonexistent) for sophisticated investors. These investors are
sufficiently well-informed that they are not influenced by the revealed preference of another
investor. The proposition further shows that social learning will have relatively strong
effects on investment choices if the investor whose choice is observed is sophisticated.63
6 3 We have assumed that sophisticated investors receive perfectly informative signals. Our results can
be extended to the case in which sophisticated investors receive more informative, but still imperfectly
informative, signals. While results for general distributions of x, si and sj that satisfy MLRP do not
exist, it is straightforward to show that for binary signal structures, the impact of social learning will be
relatively small when the observing investor is sophisticated and relatively large when the observed investor
is sophisticated. Finally, it is worth noting that, another investor's possession of the asset could still affect
financially sophisticated investors' choices; similarly a financially unsophisticated investor's purchase decision
- when accompanied by possession - could influence a peer's choice. Both of these effects would work through
the social utility channel. Thus, we emphasize that these predictions of heterogeneous treatment effects apply
to social learning effects alone, but not necessarily the overall peer effect.
94
2.C Appendix: The Financial Asset
The asset offered to clients in the experiment was a combination of an actively-managed,
open-ended long/short mutual fund and a real estate note (LCI, Letra de Criditto Imo-
bilidrio), for a term of 1 year. A client was required to make a minimum investment
of at least R$1,000 (approximately US$550) in each individual asset if he chose to pur-
chase the combination asset (for a minimum total investment of approximately US$1,100).
The long/short fund seeks to outperform the interbank deposit rate (CDI, Certificado de
Deposito InterbancTdrio) by allocating assets in fixed-income assets, equity securities and
derivatives. The LCI is a low-risk asset which is attractive to personal investors, because
it is exempt from personal income tax. The LCI offered in this particular combination had
better terms than the real estate notes that were usually offered to clients of the brokerage
with which we worked. First, the return of the LCI offered in the experiment was 98% of
the CDI, while the best LCI offered to clients outside of the experiment had a return of
97% of the CDI. In addition, the brokerage firm usually required a minimum investment
of R$10,000 to invest in an LCI, while the offer in the experiment reduced the minimum
investment threshold to R$1,000. As noted in the text, the maximum investment in the
LCI component was R$10,000.
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2.D Appendix: Experimental Documentation
We enclose here English versions of the Qualtrics scripts used by the brokers in the phone








Combination of two Investments:
- Fundo Long-Short multi-mercado (read brochure)
- LCI de 98% do CDI (read brochure)
Minimum investment:
- R$1,000 in LCI and R$1,000 in Fundo Long-Short
Maximum investment:
-R$10,000 in LCI and no limits in Fundo Long-Short
Observations to be told to client:
1) Special LCI usually not available to clients. LCI typically available to clients has return of 97% of CDI and
minimum investment of R$10,000
2) Emphasize that product can only be purchased during this call (take it or leave it): will not be sold on other
occasions
3) Remind that LCI is exempt from income tax
4) Explain that only new resources will be accepted (and not resources already invested with the brokerage)
Limited supply
This is a special asset, only available in limited supply, and only to special clients I ke you.
As so, unfortunately, some of the clients that want the asset will not be able to actually purchase it.
Since we are a company that always wants to be as fair as possible, we want to give a chance to all the special
clients we are calling and who are interested in the product. In addition to that, we would like to give the same
chance to everyone.
Because of that, we will use a lottery to determine which clients will actually be able to implement the purchase,
among those that chose to purchase the asset.
In this lottery half (50%) of the clients that choose to purchase the asset will have their choices authorized and
implemented.
The lottery consists in drawing a random integer number between 1 and 100. If the number is 50 or less, the lottery
will not authorize the investment. If the number is greater than 50, the lottery will authorize and make the investment.
It is important that you know that the decision you will make now if final. If you decide to purchase the asset, you will
be authorizing the purchase. Therefore, if the lottery authorizes the purchase, the investment will be made.
Take advantage of this great opportunity to buy this exclusive product!
Investment decision




Ask the client what their decision is
' Wants to invest
C Does not want to Invest
How much does he want to invest in the Fundo Long-Short multi-mercado?
How much does he want to invest in the LCI?
Investment authorization
A random number will now be drawn to determine whether or not you will be able to actually make the investment.
The random number is ${e://Field/random}
Due to the outcome of the lottery, your investment was not authorized.
Due to the outcome of the lottery, your investment was authorized.
Was the investment authorized?
O Yes
No
End of Call and Summary
Finish the call
This is the summary of the call. Please put the following information in your Excel spreadsheet of communication
with the clients:
Client number: ${q://QID20/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Did this client want to invest in the product? Yes
Amount invested in the Fundo Long-Short: ${q://QID18/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Amount invested in the LCI ${q://QID26/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Was this client authorized to make the investment? Yes
This is the summary of the call. Please put the following information in your Excel spreadsheet of communication
with the clients:
Client number ${q://QID20/ChoiceTextEntryValue)
Did this client want to invest in the product? Yes
Amount invested in the Fundo Long-Short: ${q://QID18/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Amount invested in the LCI: ${q://QID26/ChoiceTextEntryValue}




Was this client authorized to make the investment? No
This is the summary of the call. Please put the following information in your Excel spreadsheet of communication
with the clients:
Client number: ${q://QlD20/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Did this client want to invest in the product? No
Amount invested in the Fundo Long-Short: 0
Amount invested in the LCI: 0





Name of broker making phone call
Client number
Number of client of the (first) friend of this investor
Previous Choice by FRIEND I
Did the first friend of this investor want to invest in this asset?
Yes
No





Combination of two investments:
- Fundo Long-Short multi-mercado (read brochure)
- LCI de 98% do CDI (read brochure)
Minimum investment:
- R$1,000 in LCI and R$1,000 in Fundo Long-Short
Maximum investment:
-R$10,000 in LCI and no limits in Fundo Long-Short
Observations to be told to client:
1) Special LCI usually not avaliable to clients. LCI typically available to clients has return of 97% of CDI and
minimum
investment of R$10,000
2) Emphasize that product can only be purchased during this call (take it or leave it): will not be sold on other
occasions
3) Remind that LCI is exempt from income tax
4) Explain that only new resources will be accepted (and not resources already invested with the brokerage)
Limited Supply
This is a special asset, only available in limited supply, and only to special clients I ke you.




As so, unfortunately, some of the clients that want the asset will not be able to actually purchase it.
Since we are a company that always wants to be as fair as possible, we want to give a chance to all the special
clients we are calling and who are interested in the product. In addition to that, we would like to give the same
chance to everyone.
Because of that, we will use a lottery to determine which clients will actually be able to implement the purchase,
among those that chose to purchase the asset.
In this lottery half (50%) of the clients that choose to purchase the asset will have their choices authorized and
implemented.
The lottery consists in drawing a random integer number between 1 and 100. If the number is 50 or less, the lottery
will
not authorize the investment. If the number is greater than 50, the lottery will authorize and make the investment.
It is important that you know that the decision you will make now if final. If you decide to purchase the asset, you will
be authorizing the purchase. Therefore, if the lottery authorizes the purchase, the investment will be made.
Take advantage of this great opportunity to buy this exclusive product!
Only Learning Treatment
Before asking whether or not the client wants to purchase the asset, tell him the information associated with the
choice of the first friend and the outcome of the lottery for the first friend:
"We would like to inform you, before you make your decision, that [FIRST FRIEND'S NAME], your [RELATIONSHIP
TO THIS CLIENT), received the same offer today. He/she chose to purchase the product. However, the lottery did
not authorize him/her to make the purchase, so he/she will not make the investment."
SUMMARIZING: He/she wanted to make the investment but was not able to invest.
Possession and Learning Treatment
Before asking whether or not the client wants to purchase the asset, tell him the information associated with the
choice of the first friend and the outcome of the lottery for the first friend:
"We would like to inform you, before you make your decision, that [FIRST FRIEND'S NAME), your [RELATIONSHIP
TO THIS CLIENT], received the same offer today. He/she chose to purchase the product. The lottery authorized
him/her to make the purchase, so he/she will make the investment."
SUMMARIZING: He/she wanted to make the investment and was able to invest
Investment Decision
Ask the client what their decision is
Wants to invest
Does not want to invest
How much does he want to invest in the Fundo Long-Short multi-mercado?
How much does he want to invest in the LCI?
Page 2 of 4
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Investment Authorization
A random number will now be drawn to determine whether or not you will be able to actually make the investment.
The random number is ${e://Field/random}
Due to the outcome of the lottery, your investment was not authorized.
Due to the outcome of the lottery, your investment was authorized.
Was the investment authorized?
O Yes
No
Relationship with First Investor, End of Call, and Summary
Had you previously heard about this offer/this product from [FIRST FRIEND'S NAME]?
Yes
No
What is your degree of relationship with [FIRST FRIEND'S NAME]? Examples: sibling, parent, friend, co-worker, etc.
Finish the phone call
This is the summary of the call. Please put the following information in your Excel spreadsheet of communication
with the clients:
Client number: ${q://QlD27/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
First friend's client number: ${q://QID30/ChoiceTextEntryValue
Did the first friend want to invest in the product? ${q://QID21/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}
Was the first friend authorized to make the investment? ${q://QD25/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}
Did this client (second friend) want to invest in the product? Yes
Amount invested in the Fundo Long-Short: ${q://Q1D28/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Amount invested in the LCI: ${q://QID38/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Was this client authorized to make the investment? Yes
This is the summary of the call. Please put the following information in your Excel spreadsheet of communication
with the clients:
Client number: ${q://QID27/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
First friend's client number: ${q://QID30/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Did the first friend want to invest in the product? ${q://QID21/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}
Page 3 of 4
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Was the first friend authorized to make the investment? ${q://QID25/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}
Did this client (second friend) want to invest in the product? Yes
Amount invested in the Fundo Long-Short: ${q://QlD28/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Amount invested in the LCI: ${q://QID38/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Was this client authorized to make the investment?: No
This is the summary of the call. Please put the following information in your Excel spreadsheet of communication
with the clients:
Client number: ${q://QlD27/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
First friend's client number: ${q://QID30/ChoiceTextEntryValue}
Did the first friend want to invest in the product? ${q://QD21/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}
Was the first friend authorized to make the investment? ${q://QID25/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices)
Did this client (second friend) want to invest in the product? No
Amount invested in the Fundo Long-Short: 0
Amount invested in the LCI: 0
Was this client authorized to make the investment?: N/A
Page 4 of 4
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Chapter 3
Paying a High Price to Save?
3.1 Introduction
It is well documented that consumers in the US could pay less in financial charges by
changing the way they manage different accounts. In particular, many consumers borrow
at high interest rates from their credit cards while having enough liquid assets to cover
their credit card debt (Gross and Souleles (2002) and Stango and Zinman (2009b)). While
this borrowing high and lending low (BHLL) behavior has usually been associated with
consumer mistakes and behavioral biasesi, two recent papers suggest that the amount of
financial charges that households face due to this behavior is not that high, and could be
rationalized by demand for liquidity (Zinman (2007) and Telyukova (2011)). However, this
evidence does not directly imply that consumers would avoid BHLL when costs are higher
There is still limited evidence on whether households engage in such behavior in settings
where interest rates are higher, and on whether the spread between borrowing and savings
rates is a key determinant of these decisions.
This paper examines this phenomenon in a setting where borrowing costs are much
higher. Specifically, we look at this phenomenon in Brazil, where checking account over-
draft interest rates are, on average, equal to 8.33% per month, which corresponds to 161%
per year 2, while interest rates on savings accounts are no higher than 0.6% per month.
*This chapter is co-authored with Pedro Daniel Tavares.
'Bertaut and Haliassos (2006), Reiter and Haliassos (2007), and Bertaut ct al. (2009) present an
"accountant-shopper" model, where mental accounting would explain the decisions to simultaneously hold
credit card debt and liquid assets. Laibson et al. (2007) present a model where demand for a commitment
device would explain credit card borrowing and investments in illiquid assets.
2 February of 2012. Source: National Association of Executives in Finance, Administration and Account-
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Therefore, the interest rate spread that households pay to borrow further from their over-
drawn accounts instead of using funds from their savings accounts is around 7.7% per month
(144% per year), which is about 10 times greater than the usual spread between credit card
revolving rates and the return on liquid assets in the US.
Using information on checking and savings accounts for a sample of clients from a
large bank in Brazil, we document the prevalence of this BHLL behavior, and calculate
the amount of avoidable financial charges that households face in such a high interest
rate setting. Also, by exploring variations in the overdraft interest rates, we test whether
consumers are less likely to engage in such behavior when the associated costs are higher.
Our results suggest that the decision to borrow at high rates while holding low-yield
liquid assets is prevalent even in a setting where the costs associated with this behavior
are much higher. Around 70% of clients maintain an overdrawn account at least one day
a year while having liquid assets in their savings accounts to cover at least part of this
debt. However, the amount of financial charges that clients incur due to this behavior
is not excessively high. On average, clients would be able to avoid approximately R$100
(approximately US$60) in financial charges by transferring funds from their savings to their
checking accounts, which would represent less than 0.5% of their yearly earnings. The BHLL
cost faced by Brazilian consumers is not much larger than the one faced by US consumers.,
despite the fact that the spread between borrowing and savings rates in Brazil is around 10
times larger 3 . This suggests that the high interest rates in Brazil prevent consumers from
excessively engaging in this behavior.
There is also evidence that clients with lower overdraft rates are more likely to engage in
this behavior. Bank employees face an overdraft interest rate on the order of 4%, compared
to an interest rate on the order of 9% for non-employees. We show that employees borrow
from their overdrawn checking accounts while having liquid funds more frequently than
non-employees. After controlling for income, employees end up facing approximately the
same in financial charges that could be avoidable by using liquid assets to cover their
overdraft debt, despite the fact that they face an interest rate more than 50% lower than
ing (Anefac). Interest rates are usually stated in monthly terms in Brazil.3 Zinman (2007) estimates that the average U.S. household with a credit card pays US$100 per year in
financial charges to hold bank account balances instead of using them to pay down credit card debt. The
estimated BHLL cost faced by Brazilian consumers is smaller than that for US consumers. Considering that
the per capita GDP in the US is 4 times larger than the per capita GDP in Brazil, the BHLL cost relative
to the per capita GDP in Brazil would still be far less than 10 greater than that in the U.S.
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non-employees. These results suggest that although consumers engage in this behavior even
when the interest rate spread is high., the interest rate spread is a key determinant in these
decisions.
3.2 Economic Environment
This paper focuses on the decision to simultaneously borrow from an overdrawn checking
account while holding liquid assets in a savings account. Checking account overdraft rep-
resents 32% of the volume of consumer credit borrowing in Brazil4. Bank clients in Brazil
usually have predetermined overdraft limits on their checking accounts. If a client's balance
is below zero, but still within the overdraft limit, he will be charged the overdraft interest
rate on the average overdraft balance for a given month. The average overdraft interest rate
is equal to 8.33% per month5 . If he crosses the overdraft limit, then he will also be charged
a penalty fee, and face a higher interest rate on the amount that exceeded the overdraft
limit.
These higher overdraft interest rates make it more costly for consumers in Brazil to
borrow while still possessing liquid assets to cover their debts than for consumers in the
United States and in other developed countries. While, on average, the return on savings
accounts is also higher than in developed countries, it is still on the order of 0.6% per month,
which implies that consumers in Brazil are essentially paying around 7.7% per month on
their overdraft balances in order to keep money in their savings accounts. This implies that
a client who keeps a $100 balance in his overdrawn checking account while having liquid
funds in his savings account would have been able to save in a year $144 in financial charges
in Brazil. In contrast, considering a revolving credit card APR of 15%, a client in the US
would pay $16 in financial charges to revolve $100 with his credit card while having liquid
funds to cover this debt. Therefore, the BHLL cost in Brazil is about 10 times greater than
that in the US and in other developed countries.
In addition to being more expensive, this BHLL behavior cannot be justified by the
usual explanations for borrowing at high rates while having liquid assets. First, checking
and savings accounts are closer substitutes in terms of means of payments. A client could
4 Source: Brazilian Central Bank
5February of 2012. Source: National Association of Executives in Finance, Administration and Account-
ing (Anefac)
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convert funds from his savings account to cash as easily as he can with his checking account.
In contrast, credit cards and liquid assets would not be perfect substitutes in terms of means
of payments, as suggested by Zinman (2007). Also, when a client transfers funds from his
savings account to cover his overdraft balance, he would restore his available overdraft
limit, meaning his available liquidity would not be negatively impacted. Finally, the risk
of overdraft fees (Fusaro (2003)) or minimum balance requirements (Stavins (1999)) would
not apply to this setting. On the contrary, a client would face a lower risk by transferring
funds from savings account to his checking account, as this would reduce the likelihood of
exceeding his overdraft limit, which would result in fees and higher interest rates.
Still, it is possible that some consumers keep their funds in savings accounts while
paying checking account overdraft financial charges for rational reasons. For instance, a
client could worry that the bank would reduce his overdraft limit once he has paid off his
overdraft debt. In this case, covering the overdraft debt with funds from his savings account
would reduce his available liquidity. In fact, the overdraft terms are renewed every month,
and the bank is allowed to reduce the overdraft limits for clients at that point. In practice,
the bank policy is to reduce the overdraft credit limit when a client exceeds his overdraft
limit for more than 90 days. Another important potential rationale for this behavior would
be strategic default (as in Lehnert and Maki (2002)). While both the checking and savings
accounts are held by the same bank, the savings account is not used as collateral for the
overdraft debt. Therefore., a client would be able to default on his overdraft debt, but still
access the funds from his savings account.
Other reason for BHLL could be transaction costs. Presumably, transferring funds from
savings accounts to checking accounts should be easy and costless. The transfer's monetary
cost is zero, and a client may use any bank channel: online banking, automated teller
machines, branches, and call centers. However, there might still be some non-monetary
transaction costs. Finally, clients might keep an overdrawn checking account due to limited
attention, as they might not keep track of their checking account balances (Grubb (2012)).
3.3 Data and Methodology
In this paper, we examine information taken from the checking and savings accounts of
a sample of clients from a major Brazilian bank. Since our focus is the decision to si-
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multaneously hold overdraft debt and liquid assets, we restrict our sample to clients who
have predetermined limits on their checking accounts. We constructed a sample with 6, 000
observations, half of which consists of clients with the standard overdraft interest rate of
approximately 9% per month, while the other half consists of employees of the bank, who
pay the reduced overdraft interest rate of approximately 4% per month. Our information
for each client includes daily checking account balances, overdraft limits, and overdraft in-
terest rates, as well as their savings account balances from the end of each month. We have
information for one entire year6 .
Using the above information, we are able to calculate the overdraft financial charges
for each consumer, and estimate the amount of financial charges that each consumer could
avoid by using liquid assets from his savings account to cover his overdraft balance. The
actual financial charges a consumer faces in a given month (C) are defined by:
S(r 
- r)
C = Dix + (De- L) x T + Fxl{B >Lfor some t} (3.1)
t=1 __=1
where Dt is the overdraft balance at day t (equal to zero if the checking account has a
positive balance), T is the number of days of the specific month, r is the overdraft interest
rate, L is the overdraft limit, f is the interest rate the consumer faces when he exceeds the
overdraft limit, and F is the fee that the consumer faces when he exceeds the overdraft
limit.
In order to estimate the total amount of avoidable financial charges, we calculate the
charges that a client would face if he used funds from his savings account to cover this
balance (C*). Unfortunately we do not have information on daily savings account balances.
Instead, we consider that a client would be able to use at least the minimum between his
savings balance at the beginning and at the end of the month (B = min{Bm, Bm+1}). In
this case:
Tr T(r-r)
C= Zmax{0, Dt - B} x YZ(max{0,Dt - B} - L}) x T + (3.2)
t=1 t=1
+F x 1{max{0, Dt - B} > L for some t}
6 We are not allowed to disclose the year of data we are using due to the disclosure agreement with the
cooperating bank.
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Therefore, the amount of avoidable financial charges would be equal to C - C*. The
opportunity cost of using funds from the savings account to cover the overdraft debt and
avoid financial charges would be the foregone return on the savings account, which is around
0.6% of the amount used to cover the debt.
In order to study how the prevalence and cost of this behavior is affected by the overdraft
interest rate, we compare bank clients and bank employees. The overdraft interest rate
for bank employees is approximately 4% per month. While this rate is still much higher
than revolving credit card interest rates in the United States, it is less than half the rates
generally faced by clients. Of course, there are many inherent differences between bank
clients and bank employees. In particular, bank employees have, on average, higher income
and higher credit limit. To mitigate this obvious omitted variable bias, we control flexibly
for income, credit limit, and number of months since the checking account was opened.
In some regressions, we also condition our sample of bank clients to those who receive
their salaries through the cooperating bank. Even after these controls, it might still be
possible that bank employees have a better understanding of financial decisions. Also, bank
employees might also face lower transaction costs to transfer funds from their savings to
their checking accounts. These omitted variables would bias our estimates towards finding
no effect of interest rates on the prevalence of BHLL.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Prevalence and Cost of BHLL
We start by presenting a descriptive analysis of the prevalence and cost of this BHLL
behavior in a setting where borrowing rates are approximately equal to 9% per month.
In column 1 of Table 3-1, we present the proportion of clients that borrowed from their
overdrawn checking accounts while having liquid funds in their savings accounts at some
point in one year. This behavior is highly prevalent, and around 70% of the clients were in
this situation at least one day in a period of one year. Still, it is important to understand
whether this is a recurrent behavior, and whether clients end up facing significant costs
by engaging in this behavior. In columns 2 and 3 of Table 3-1, we present, respectively,
the mean and percentiles of the number of days that clients were in a BHLL state and the
monetary cost due to this behavior. On average, clients stay around 84 days per year in a
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BHLL state, which leads to around R$100 (approximately US$60) in financial charges that
could be avoided. This number is actually not higher than the BHLL costs that Zinman
(2007) calculates for US consumers, despite the fact that consumers in Brazil face much
higher interest rates. As presented in column 4, the BHLL cost represents, on average, only
around 0.5% of clients' yearly earnings. Looking at the distribution, the avoidable financial
charges per year is smaller than 1.3% of clients' yearly earnings for 90% of the clients.
3.4.2 Prevalence and Cost of BHLL - Clients vs. Employees
In addition to documenting BHLL prevalence and cost among bank clients in Brazil. we are
able to use variation in the overdraft interest rate between bank employees and bank clients
to estimate how the decision to borrow at high interest rates while holding liquid funds in
the savings account is affected by the spread between borrowing and savings rates.
Table 3-2 presents the prevalence and cost of BHLL behavior separately for bank clients
and bank employees. Panel i of Table 3-3 presents the comparison in means of the relevant
dependent variables, using OLS regressions without controls. Bank employees are 15 per-
centage points more likely to borrow from their overdrawn checking accounts while having
liquid funds on their savings account at least one day per year, and stay in this position for
almost 40 days more per year than bank clients. The annual BHLL cost for bank employees
is significantly higher than that of bank clients, despite the fact that bank employees face
much lower interest rates.
These numbers should be taken with caution, since bank employees and non-employees
might differ in a variety of dimensions. In order to mitigate the problem of omitted variables,
the regressions presented in panel ii of Table 3-3 include as control variables 5 order polyno-
mials of income, overdraft limit, and number of months since checking account was opened.
Although the difference in prevalence of BHLL between bank employees and bank clients is
smaller after including these controls, bank employees are still more likely to borrow from
their overdrawn checking accounts while having liquid funds on their savings account at
least one day per year, and stay in this situation for almost 20 days more per year than
bank clients. After including these controls, however, the difference in annual BHLL costs
between bank clients and employees is close to zero, and not statistically significant.
In order to take into account the fact that bank employees have lower interest rates, in
Table 3-4 we calculate the BHLL cost calculated as if both bank clients and bank employees
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had the higher overdraft interest rate of approximately 9%. This is a measure of the effect
of the overdraft interest rate on the "quantity" of BHLL. As expected, even after controlling
for income and credit limit, employees would face a much higher BHLL cost, and this would
represent a higher fraction of their monthly earnings, if they were charged the same interest
rate as bank clients. Given these estimates, the elasticity of BHLL with respect to the
overdraft interest rate would be around -2.97.
In Table 3-5, we restrict the sample of bank clients to those who receive their salaries
through the cooperating bank. This way we consider only bank clients who have a stable
stream of earnings and, therefore, should be more comparable to bank employees. All results
remain similar8
Although there are presumably other omitted variables that might bias these results,
the comparison between bank clients and bank employees provides suggestive evidence that
the spread between borrowing and savings rates is a key determinant of the decisions to
borrow at high interest rates while having liquid funds yielding a lower return to cover this
debt.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Borrowing high and lending low (BHLL) is prevalent for many Brazilian consumers. Around
70% of the consumers face financial charges that could be avoided by transferring funds from
their savings to their checking accounts. However, the high interest rates faced by Brazilian
consumers seem to prevent them from engaging in this behavior recurrently and excessively.
The BHLL cost faced by Brazilian consumers is no higher than what is documented in de-
veloped countries, where the spread between borrowing and saving rates is much lower.
In addition, a comparison between bank clients (who have an overdraft interest rate of
approximately 9%) and bank employees (who have a lower overdraft interest rate of ap-
proximately 4%) suggests that the spread between borrowing and savings rates is indeed
a key determinant of these decisions. Bank employees borrow more from their overdrawn
checking accounts while having liquid funds in their savings accounts, even after controlling
7 The elasticity is calculated as e = } x f, where # is the coefficient on the employee dummy, /r is the
difference in the overdraft interest rate for employees and clients, and Y and r are the BHLL and interest
rate averages.
8 The only qualitative difference in the restricted sample regressions is the effect of bank employee on
BHLL cost. In these regressions, there is a small positive effect of the bank employee dummy on the BHLL
cost (significant at 5%), even after controlling for income, credit limit, and time since account was opened.
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for income, credit limit, and time since the account was opened. Taken together, these re-
sults suggest that consumers are less likely to engage in this behavior when costs are higher,
which implies in an upper bound on the financial problems that this behavior might entail.
Still, these results would be consistent with rational models with demand for liquidity and
strategic default, behavioral biases, or consumer mistakes. Consumers might see the spread
between borrowing and saving rates as a "price" to keep their funds in their savings ac-
counts. Alternatively, consumers might be more attentive and correct their decisions when
the stakes are higher. Understanding the rationale behind these decisions is still an open
question.
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3.A Appendix: Figures and Tables
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Notes: Column 1 shows the proportion of clients that were negative on their checking
accounts while holding a positive balance on their savings accounts at least one day
during a period of one year. Column 2 shows the mean and percentiles of the number
of days that clients were in a BHLL position. Column 3 shows the mean and per-
centiles of the avoidable financial charges due to BHLL. Column 4 shows the mean and
percentiles of the avoidable financial charges calculate in column 3 divided by client's
yearly earnings. These results are calculating using the pooled sample of 3, 000 bank
clients and 3, 000 bank employees. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the
probability that the client was selected so that they represent the original population.
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Variable: Probability Number of Yearly Yearly BHLL cost
of BHLL of BHLL days BHLL cost Yearly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean 0.702 83.8 103.8 0.005
25th percentile 0.0 0.0 0.000
50th percentile 42.0 2.9 0.000
75th percentile 142.0 56.4 0.003
90th percentile 248.0 233.8 0.013
95th percentile 295.0 426.6 0.024
99th percentile 348.0 1,539.4 0.086
# of observations 6000 6000 6000 5147
of Borrowing High and Lending Low BehaviorTable 3-1: Prevalence and Cost
Variable: Probability Number of Yearly Yearl BHLL cost
of BHLL of BHLL days BHLL cost Yearly earnings
Client Employee Client Employee Client Employee Client Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean 0.700 0.851 83.2 120.9 102.9 162.7 0.005 0.003
25th percentile 0.0 13.5 0.0 0.0 0.000 0.000
50th percentile 41.0 92.0 2.8 31.5 0.000 0.001
75th percentile 142.0 210.0 55.6 174.1 0.003 0.004
90th percentile 247.5 297.0 228.0 476.7 0.013 0.010
95th percentile 294.5 326.0 422.7 769.6 0.025 0.016
99th percentile 348.0 360.5 1,505.4 1,539.9 0.091 0.030
# of observations 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 2,702 2,431
Notes: This table shows the prevalence and cost that consumers faced for being negative on their checking account
while holding positive balances on their savings accounts, separately for clients (who have an overdraft interest
rate of approximately 9% per month) and bank employees (who have an overdraft interest rate of approximately
4%). See footnote of Table 3-1 for the definition of the corresponding variables.
I,
Table 3-2: Prevalence and Cost of BHLL, for Clients (i,,z- 9% per month) and Employees (i ~11 4%)
Table 3-3: Effect of Employee Status on BHLL - Regression Results
Variable: Probability Number of Yearly Yearly BHLL cost
of BHLL of BHLL days BHLL cost Yearly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
. No controls
Employee dummy 0.151*** 37.7*** 59.8*** -0.002***
(0.011) (2.7) (12.1) (0.000)
Number of observations 6000 6000 6000 5133
ii. Include controls
Employee dummy 0.076*** 19.0*** -28.1 -0.001***
(0.012) (3.0) (17.9) (0.000)
Number of observations 5873 5873 5873 5133
Mean for clients 0.700 83.2 102.9 0.005
Notes: This table shows regression estimates comparing the BHLL prevalence and cost
for clients and bank employees. Omitted category is non-employees, who had an overdraft
interest rate of approximately 9%. Regressions in panel i do not include controls. Regressions
in panel ii include a 5 order polynomials on income, overdraft limit, and number of months
since checking account was open as controls. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. See
footnote of table 3-1 for the definition of the corresponding variables. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3-4: Effect of Employee Status on BHLL - Normalized
Variable: Normalized yearly Normalized yearly BHLL cost
BHLL cost Yearly earnings
(1) (2)
i. No controls
Employee dummy 316.1*** 0.003***
(18.7) (0.000)
Number of observations 6000 5133
ii. Include controls
Employee dummy 162.5*** 0.004***
(20.3) (0.000)
Number of observations 5873 5133
Mean for clients 101.5 0.005
Notes: This table shows regression estimates comparing the BHLL costs and
relevance for clients and bank employees. BHLL costs are normalized to take
into account that bank clients and bank employees have different interest rates.
BHLL normalized costs are calculated considering that everyone had an interest
rate of 8.75%. Omitted category is non-employees. Regressions in panel i do
not include controls. Regressions in panel ii include a 5 order polynomials on
income, overdraft limit, and number of months since checking account was open
as controls. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3-5: Effect of Employee Status on BHLL - Restricted Sample
Variable: Probability Number of Yearly Yearly BHLL cost Normalized Normalized BHLL cost
of BHLL of BHLL days BHLL cost Yearly earnings BHLL cost Yearly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
i. No controls
Employee 0.065*** 27.7*** 90.2*** -0.001* 352.9*** 0.005***
dummy (0.013) (3.4) (8.9) (0.000) (17.3) (0.000)
N 4192 4192 4192 3639 4192 3639
ii. Include controls
Employee 0.045*** 17.1*** 23.9** 0.000 196.1*** 0.005***
dummy (0.014) (3.8) (10.3) (0.000) (14.8) (0.000)
N 4192 4192 4192 3639 4192 3639
Mean for 0.802 95.9 75.8 0.004 74.5 0.004
clients (0.000) (0.0) (0.0) (0.000) (0.0) (0.000)
Notes: This table shows regression estimates from Tables 3-3 and 3-4 using a restricted sample of clients who receive
their salaries through the cooperating bank. See footnote of Tables 3-1 and 3-4 for the definition of the corresponding
variables. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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